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STRIVING TO TEACH "JUSTICE, FAIRNESS,
AND MORALITY"
JANE HARRIS AIKEN*
Imagine the following discussion between a student and his
supervisor:
Student: "Michael's dying. .
Supervisor: "I know."
Student: "And this is the last time that he and Josh will be able to
be together. He told me when I interviewed him that all
he wanted was to have Josh with him in the hospital room.
They won't let him in. His parents say that Josh was the
cause of all of this and he is not to get anywhere near
Michael."
Supervisor: "Have you thought about what you can do to help
Michael?"
Student: "Michael was fine last week. This bout of pneumonia came
on so quickly, he didn't get to sign the health care power
of attorney."
Supervisor: "Why is that necessary?"
Student: "The hospital's policy says that only spouses and family
and people with health care powers of attorney can get
into intensive care. Josh doesn't fit into any of those
categories even though they have been together eleven
years."
Supervisor: "Why can't he just go to the hospital and see him?"
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University of South Carolina. Special thanks go to Anthony Amsterdam, Martha Chamal-
las, Kathleen Clark, Clark Cunningham, Barbara Flagg, Katherine Goldwasser, Thomas
Hagerty, Angela Harris, Robert MacCrate, George Scouten, Marge Shultz, Abbe Smith
and Karen Tokarz, who offered me criticism of the work as it progressed. I am indebted to
Stephen Ellmann, the Clinical Theory Workshop, and its participants for the opportunity
to present this idea and for their comments early in the drafting process. I wish to thank
my research assistant, Catherine Smith, who was not only tireless in her efforts to find
scholarly support for this article but also played a critical role in the development and
refinement of the ideas. Thanks also to Eric M. Johnsen, who provided extraordinary re-
search asistance and attention to detail as the project neared the end. I wish to thank the
University of South Carolina School of Law for the research support that made this article
possible and for the valuable comments offered by Susan Rutberg, Peter Tepley and my
colleagues John Lopatka, William McAninch, David Owen, Marie Reilly, Eldon Wedlock,
and Richard Young, Visiting Professor and Fulbright Scholar, U.S.C. and Lecturer in Law,
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Student: "I thought that was exactly what would happen. I guess
that's why I didn't finish the power of attorney faster.
Michael had introduced Josh to all the nurses, and they
know that Josh is who he wants with him when he dies.
But the family has a lawyer now, and the hospital won't
bend its rules. I can't believe it. It's so unfair. Michael's
parents haven't even seen him since he left home thirteen
years ago. Now they get to keep Josh out?"
A typical supervisor's response to this student might be to ask,
"What are your options?" One might expect the student to reply:
"Well I could call the hospital attorney and discuss with him the
document that we prepared and try to get it enforced as Michael's
intent." The supervisor might then continue to inquire about the
outcome of that strategy, what the law says about unsigned health
care powers of attorney, and other legal ramifications.
Such an interchange between supervisor and student would
certainly encourage the development of the student's skills of legal
analysis and research. It would focus the student on the law as it is
and move him away from feeling that the situation is unfair. Another
approach to this scenario, however, is to try to use the student's own
sense of frustration and injustice to teach him about his role as a
lawyer in promoting the ideals of justice, fairness and morality.1
What questions should a supervisor ask? What lessons about
justice can be drawn here? Should the supervisor be content with the
fact that the student now can see a clear contrast in how the law treats
a gay person differently from a heterosexual person? How does the
learner make the leap from that contrast to an insight about how the
law incorporates a heterosexual point of view? What generalizations
can the student make from the law's lack of neutrality that will assist
him in using that insight? Is the supervisor overstepping the bounds
if she urges the student to examine how his preconceptions resulted in
his being unprepared for this possibility? How can the supervisor
assist the student in this learning without prompting confusion and
retreat? Clearly, mere exposure to the client's reality is not enough.
This learning experience should assist the student in seeing how his
1 Teachers who take on a social justice agenda are often vulnerable to attack. We are
accused of totalitarianism and "political correctness." We are criticized for allegedly
abusing our power as a professor by forcing our agenda on our students. I do not intend to
argue with those accusations here. Others have done it far more eloquently than I. See,
e.g., BELL HOOKS, TEACHING TO TRANSGRESS: EDUCATION AS THE PRACTICE OF
FREEDOM (1994) (hereinafter HOOKS, TEACHING); Howard Lesnick, The Integration of
Responsibility and Values: Legal Education in an Alternative Consciousness of Lawyering
and Law, 10 NOVA. L. REV. 633 (1986). But see Robert Condlin, "Tastes Great, Less
Filling": The Law School Clinic and Political Critique, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 45 (1986)
(arguing that law school clinics should not engage in "politicizing" students).
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own bias made him unable to anticipate his client's needs, thus
limiting his ability to serve the client. It demonstrates how his
unawareness of his own heterosexuality affects his vision, reinforces
the status quo, and can heighten his client's pain. More importantly,
this poignant moment in his relationship with his client can prompt
him to anticipate the ways his various privileges may have affected
him in other areas of his life. It is this understanding that will make
transformational learning possible.2 It is through the practice of this
understanding that the student can learn how to promote justice,
fairness and morality.
Everything we do as law teachers suggests something about
justice.3 Recent studies of law schools are urging that we be more
explict about justice in legal education.4 The Report of the Task Force
on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap (the
2 By transformational learning, I mean the creation of opportunties for reflection and
reorientation of a learner's values. Such a project necessarily raises ethical issues. Jack
Mezirow raises a few of these questions. He asks if it is ethical for an educator to:
" Intentionally precipitate transformative learning without making sure that the
learner fully understands that such transformation may result.
" Facilitate a perspective transformation when its consequences may include
dangerous or hopeless actions.
" Decide which among a learner's beliefs should become questioned or
problematized.
" Present his or her own perspective, which may be unduly influential with the
learner.
" Refuse to help a learner plan to take an action because the educator's personal
convictions are in conflict with those of the learner.
" Make educational interventions when psychic distortions appear to impede the
learner's progress if the educator is not trained as a psychotherapist.
JACK MEZIROw, TRANSFORMATIVE DIMENSIONS OF ADULT LEARNING 201 (1991). He
concludes that all of these acts are ethical, and I agree. Indeed, I question whether our
failure to address these issues in legal education is ethical. Every time we reinforce the
idea that the law is neutral, we reinforce hierarchy and domination.
3 Justice in application is fundamentally a political phenomenon. See David
Barnhizer, The Justice Mission of American Law Schools, 40 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 285, 293
(1992).
4 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT - AN
EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM (REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE
PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP) (1992) (hereinafter. MACCRATE) and THE AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR,
PROFESSIONALISM COMMITEE, TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM (1996). The
fact that these documents were produced by the ABA is significant because the ABA is the
accrediting agency for law schools. Law schools must pay attention to criticism of how
they conduct their education of law students because it could have ramifications for
continuing accreditation. Since the publication of the MacCrate Report, the ABA has
refined accreditation standards to reflect many of the concerns raised by MacCrate.
Furthermore, because law schools are increasingly looking to the Bar for funding for law
school programs, lawyers' attitudes toward the effectiveness of legal education could have
financial consequences. Law schools across the nation have created MacCrate task forces
to begin the process of implementing its suggestions.
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MacCrate Report) exhorts us to use opportunities like this moment
with the student not just to teach the law of health care powers of
attorney but to raise those questions of justice, fairness, and morality
that lurk just below the surface. 5 The MacCrate Report identifies four
fundamental values of the profession:
1) provision of competent representation;
2) striving to promote justice, fairness and morality;
3) striving to improve the profession; and
4) professional self-development.
By far the most challenging value is the injunction to strive to
promote justice, fairness, and morality. Arguably, the first value, the
provision of competent representation, can be fostered by effective
skills training. The third value, striving to improve the profession, can
be fostered through active participation in the Bar. The fourth value,
professional self-development, appears to be mainly concerned with
effective Continuing Legal Education programs that enhance lawyers'
ability to learn through expereince. Yet methods of promoting the
second value are not only less obvious than they are for the other
three values, but also more difficult. 6 The MacCrate Report, although
5 MACCRATE, supra note 4, at 213. The MacCrate report, released in July 1992, has
been the subject of much debate both within the ABA and the Academy. See generally
Michael Norwood, Legal Education: Past Developments, Present Status and Future
Possibilities, Scenes from the Continuum: Sustaining the MacCrate Report's Vision of Law
School Education into the Twenty-First Century, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 293 (1995);
Symposium on the MacCrate Report: Papers from the Midwest Clinical Teachers'
Conference, 1 CLIN. L. REV. 349 (1994); John J. Costonis, The MacCrate Report: Of
Loaves, Fishes, and the Future of American Legal Education, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 157
(1993). Since the MacCrate Report's release, law schools have grappled with meeting the
goals articulated in the report. Although the report is not designed to be prescriptive, it
does identify a list of skills and values new lawyers should seek to acquire. There has been
much written about the skills portion of the Statement of Skills and Values (SSV). Legal
educators feel fairly confident that they know how to teach skills such as problem-solving,
negotiation, counseling, and legal research. The only debate in this area is whether and
how much the skills should be taught. But how does one promote justice, fairness, and
morality? How does the law school participate in that endeavor through teaching?
6 Educators have identified the questions that the issue of justice poses but have not
outlined the ways in which those questions should be addressed in legal education. David
Barnhizer identifies the following key questions that should be the focus of legal education:
1. What do we consider to be a just society?
2. What are the terms of such a society?
3. What kinds of behaviors tend toward facilitating the creation of such a society?
4. What behaviors undermine a society we consider just?
5. How do we or ought we organize our political institutions so that they behave in a
manner we consider just?
6. How do we or ought we ensure that our institutions are generative, adaptive, self-
evaluative and regenerative?
7. What ideals are integral to a workable vision of the individual and social human
committed to living a just life?
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eloquent in its articulation of this value, only spends three pages
discussing it. In its section on justice, fairness and morality, the
report suggests three areas in which attorneys can promote this value
in their daily practice. They are: 1) when the lawyer is making
decisions for a client; 2) when counseling clients about decisions the
client must make; and 3) by treating others with dignity and respect.
In addition, members of the profession can strive to promote justice
by ensuring that adequate legal services are provided for those who
cannot afford to pay and working toward the enhancement of the
law's ability to do justice.7
The MacCrate Report itself acknowledges that its inventory of
skills and values is a "work in progress" and invites members of the
legal community to expand and refine it.8 This article responds to that
invitation by suggesting ways in which we can teach future lawyers
about how to promote justice in their daily practice. First, I discuss the
ways in which legal education is presently failing in this endeavor.
Next, I outline a learning theory that offers a model for teaching
about justice through the systematic study of incidences of injustice. I
then describe a clinical experience in which the students encountered
injustice in the course of representing clients and analyze how and
perhaps why that experience affected the students' sense of justice.
8. What can a law faculty, law schools, lawyers, judges and legislators do that helps
American society address the awesome challenges it faces?
Barnhizer, supra note 3, at 322. These are questions rarely asked in a law school curricu-
lum. Unmasking privilege is a prerequisite to being able to understand these questions and
attempting to answer them. Otherwise, we are bound to reproduce power relations that
undermine justice.
7 The MacCrate Report specifically states:
Striving to Promote Justice, Fairness, and Morality
As a member of a profession that bears "special responsibili[ties] for the quality
of justice," a lawyer should be committed to the values of:
2.1 Promoting Justice, Fairness, and Morality in One's Own Daily Practice,
including:
(a) To the extent required or permitted by the ethical rules of the profession,
acting in conformance with considerations of justice, fairness, and morality
when making decisions or acting on behalf of a client... ;
(b) To the extent required or permitted by the ethical rules of the profession,
counseling clients to take considerations of justice, fairness and morality
into account when the client makes decisions or engages in conduct that
may have an adverse effect on other individuals or on society ... ;
(c) Treating other people (including clients, other attorneys, and support
personnel) with dignity and respect;
2.2 Contributing to the Profession's Fulfillment of its Responsibilities to Ensure that
Adequate legal Services Are Provided to Those Who Cannot Afford to Pay for
Them;
2.3 Contributing to the Profession's Fulfillment of its Responsibilities to Enhance the
Capacity of Law and Legal Institutions to Do Justice.
MACCRATE, supra note 4, at 213.
8 MACCRATE, supra note 4, at 123-24, 130-31.
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Finally, I look at ways in which the learning theory and the insights
gained from this clinical exprience can be used in other clinical
courses as well as in traditional law school courses. I offer examples
of methods that may make the MacCrate aspiration operational.
I. OUR FAILURE TO TEACH JUSTICE
The MacCrate Report suggests that legal education could be do-
ing a better job of instilling the value of promoting justice, fairness,
and morality. Legal education is failing both directly and indirectly.
First, educators often act as if lawyers play no role in the achievement
of justice. Consequently, legal educators neglect to address issues of
justice when the opportunity arises. Second, in those circumstances in
which justice is discussed, too often the message that students receive
is that justice is merely the product of the application of neutral rules.
We ignore the fact that the exercise of judgment, perhaps the most
fundamental of legal skills, is inherently value laden.
We communicate a great deal about the (un)importance of justice
when we do not focus on it explicitly. The professor who responds to
the student concerned about fairness with questions that are limited to
what "the law says" is communicating ideas about justice and moral-
ity. The failure to address the student's concerns may communicate
that those concerns have no place in the practice of law. Legal educa-
tion often ignores the significant role that lawyers play in shaping pub-
lic policy.9  It includes little or no discussion of the social
consequences of a lawyer's acts and decisions not to act. 10 Yet, practic-
ing lawyers make legally significant decisions on a daily basis, perhaps
as much or more so than do judges, legislators and adminstrators.11
9 See, generally IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE By LAW: TRE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION
OF RACE (1996). It is not as if there were not a need for lawyers concerned with justice. In
a national survey of people living at or below 125% of the poverty line, 80% of the legal
problems were handled without the benefit of legal assistance. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIA-
TION CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL SERVICES AND THE PUBLIC, Two NATIONWIDE SURVEYS:
1989 PILOT ASSESSMENTS OF THE UNMET LEGAL NEEDS OF THE POOR AND OF THE PUBLIC
GENERALLY 37 (1989).
10 Jerold S. Auerbach, What Has The Teaching of Law To Do With Justice?, 53 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 457 (1978). If all I can do in law school is to teach students skills ungrounded in a
sense of justice then at best there is no meaning to my work, and, at worst, I am contribut-
ing to the distress in the world. I am sending more people into the community armed with
legal training but without a sense of responsibility for others or for the delivery of justice in
our society.
11 The need to make future lawyers aware of their responsibility toward the poor in this
country becomes more crucial every day. State and federal legislatures are actively en-
gaged in attacks on the poor and poor people's advocates. Congress has exacted deep cuts
in funding and has created restrictions on the kinds of claims that can be brought by offices
funded by the Legal Service Corporation. States are receiving waivers and are designing
programs that significantly reduce public benefits and require the poor to jump over ever
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Very few case books address issues of fairness, justice and morality. 12
When they do, many professors, intentionally or subconsciously, skip
the cases or footnotes that focus on sexual harassment, sexual orienta-
tion, race and class issues, and the intricacies that arise due to the
overlap of these characteristics. 13
Focusing solely on "what the law says" also reinforces the idea
that lawyers are legal technicians, that the practice of law is merely the
exercise of applying fixed neutral rules to a given situation, that justice
has no other content than the results that emanate from the applica-
tion of these rules.14 The pedagogical assumption within law schools
is that our subject matter is innately neutral. 15 Law is merely a pro-
cess and there is no common good, no common goals toward which
everyone is collectively working.' 6 Many of us urge students to ap-
proach the law with a studied detachment to rid themselves of the
emotion and personal experiences that may color their approach to a
problem. 17 Students learn quickly to search for the rule that will gov-
higher hurdles to maintain their meager benefits. Our students, however, are coming from
backgrounds in which most are completely unaware of the needs of the poor. Income and
wealth disparities in this country are greater than they have been in the last fifty years. See
Inequality: For Richer, For Poorer, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 5, 1994, at 19; see also KEVIN P.
PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF RICH AND POOR: WEALTH AND THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE
IN THE REAGAN AFTERMATH (1990).
12 See, e.g., Ann Althouse, The Lying Woman, The Devious Prostitute, and Other Sto-
ries from the Evidence Casebook, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 914 (1994).
13 See Leslie Bender, Hidden Messages in the Required First-Year Law School Curricu-
lum, 40 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 387 (1992).
14 This view assumes that the prevailing allocations of wealth and power are based on
neutral principles and are acquired through pure merit.
15 Even in our relationships with clients, the traditional image of the lawyer is that she
can espouse any viewpoint of any client, that she is neutral as to political content. See
Naomi R. Cahn, Styles of Lawyering, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1063 (1992).
16 These ideas are hardly unique to law. Lester C. Thurow describes this phenomenon
in economics when he describes both democracy and capitalism as processes divorced from
values:
When anyone talks about societies being organic wholes, something more than the
statistical summation of their individual members' wants and achievements, both
captialists and democrats assert that there is no such thing. In both, individual free-
dom dominates community obligations. All political or economic transactions are
voluntary. If an individual does not want to vote, or buy something, that is his or her
right. If citizens want to be greedy and vote their narrow self-interest at the expense
of others, that is their right. In the most vigorous expression of capitalistic ethics,
crime is simply another economic activity that happens to have a high price (ail) if
one is caught. There is no social obligation to obey the law. There is nothing that
one "ought" not to do. Duties and obligations do not exist. Only market transac-
tions exist.
LESTER C. THUROw, THE FUTURE OF CAPITALISM 159 (1996).
17 Shauna Van Praagh, Stories in Law School: An Essay on Language, Participation,
and the Power of Legal Education, 2 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 111 (1992). Perhaps one of
the reasons for how little law schools examine oppression is the demographic composition
of law school faculty.
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ern a given situation and take the passion out of the problem.18 There
is no room within this framework to examine how an individual
learner's perspective affects his or her identification and assessment of
the legal problem and choice of rule.19 I have talked with professors
who pride themselves on exams that if answered on the basis of the
student's innate sense of justice, would inevitably be answered "incor-
rectly."'20 Only that student who has successfully learned to leave her
sense of compassion at the door will master this type of exam. 21 We
are actively training students to divorce themselves from issues relat-
ing to justice, fairness and morality.22
Law schools often ignore the skill of exercising judgment and the
enormous power with which lawyers are vested in the attorney/client
relationship. 23 Lawyers' decisions, unlike those made by judges, legis-
lators, and adminstrators, are not subject to any review by others.
Making decisions for clients and counseling clients about the decisions
they must make require lawyers to exercise judgment. MacCrate rec-
ognizes that this is where lawyers affect justice24 since these decisions
18 Nina J. Crimm, A Study: Law School Student's Moral Perspectives In the Context of
Advocacy and Decision-Making Roles, 29 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1 (1994).
19 Such a separation runs counter to the literature on adult learning and inhibits the
learners' ability and openness to learning about justice and morality. See Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Narrowing the Gap by Narrowing the Field: What's Missing from the MacCrate
Report - Of Skills, Legal Science and Being a Human Being, 69 WASH. L. REV. 621
(1994).
20 These exams assume that "thinking like a lawyer" means suppressing one's personal
and political beliefs. For a thoughtful discussion of this attitude within the law school, see
Angela P. Harris & Marjorie M. Shultz, A (nother) Critique of Pure Reason: Toward Civic
Virtue in Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1773 (1993).
21 This has demonstrable effects on women students' ability to succeed in the tradi-
tional ways in law school. See Lani Guinier, Michelle Fine & Jane Balin, Becoming Gentle-
men: Women's Experience at One Ivy League Law School, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1994).
22 That separation from justice, reinforced daily in classes, only affirms privilege and
perpetuates dominance. As an educator, I can only act ethically if I do not attempt to force
my own perspective on the students but encourage learners to choose from a wide range of
viewpoints. See MEZIROW, supra note 2, at 225. Mezirow points out, however, that an
educator is not bound to help a learner carry out actions that are in conflict with the educa-
tor's own code of ethics.
23 See Tom Clark, Teaching Professional Ethics, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 249 (1975);
James R. Elkins, The Pedagogy of Ethics, 10 J. LEGAL PROF. 37 (1985); Anthony T.
Kronman, Living in the Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 835 (1987). There are many skills that are
essential to effective lawyering. Obviously, it is not enough to understand privilege if one
does not have the skills to put that knowledge into operation. Clinical legal education is
one place in the law school curriculum where those skills are learned. As Norman Redlich
points out, "[I]dealistic young men and women [are] leaving law school, intently anxious to
deal with problems of poverty, discrimination, homelessness, or an inadequate education
system, and [do] not possess the widest possible range of tools to make one's legal educa-
tion effective." Norman Redlich, Challenging Injustice: A Dedication to Bob McKay, 40
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 347, 350 (1992).
24 MACCRATE, supra note 4, at 213. The desire to promote justice is not a value that
suddenly emerges upon admission to the Bar. See JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES: THE
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often reflect the value system of the lawyer.25 Rarely do our students
have the opportunity to discuss what kind of lawyer they want to be,
what norms should control their behavior, and how they should relate
to clients, adversaries, judges, support personnel, and other third par-
ties.26 Frequently the "values" portion of the law school curriculum is
relegated to a two- or three-credit professional responsibility course. 27
In some cases, even these courses utterly fail to address the issue of
justice, reducing value choices within the profession to the mere appli-
cation of professional rules.28 In those instances, there is frequently
little or no discussion of the lawyer's responsibility to serve the public
and to further the interests of justice, fairness, and morality.29
Justice, fairness, and morality are teachable, provided we offer
the kinds of experiences that make compassionate insight possible. 30
DRAMATIC STORY OF THE SOUTHERN JUDGES OF THE FIFrH CIRCUIT WHO TRANSLATED
THE SUPREME COURT'S BROWN DECISION INTO A REVOLUTION FOR EQUALITY (1981);
PETER H. IRONS, THE COURAGE OF THEIR CONVICTIONS (1988).
25 The MacCrate Report identified the following fundamental skills: problem solving,
legal analysis and reasoning, legal research, factual investigation, communication, counsel-
ing, negotiation, litigation and alternative dispute resolution procedures, organization and
management of legal work, and recognizing and resolving ethical dilemmas. Statement of
Fundamental Lawyering Skills and Professional Values, MACCRATE, supra note 4, at 15-84.
The Report suggests that these skills are the foundation for effective, competent lawyering.
The statement, however, also envisions the coexistence of fundamental professional values
of justice, fairness, and morality. These qualities are hard to teach. Robert A. Solomon,
Teaching Morality, 40 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 507 (1992). However, they are the backbone of
judgment, which is perhaps the fundamental legal skill. In this article, I argue that we can
teach students to exercise judgment so as to promote justice. In doing so, I recognize that
formidable scholars have concluded that judgment is not a skill that is teachable. Imman-
uel Kant said that "judgment is a peculiar talent which can be practiced only, and cannot
be taught. It is the specific quality of so-called mother-wit; and its lack no school can make
good." IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON *A133/B172 (Norman K. Smith
trans., 1968). I am in agreement with David Luban and Michael Millemann, who specifi-
cally address this observation by Kant:
We are inclined to deny Kant's implicit distinction between things that can be taught
and things that can (only) be practiced - For the disinction overlooks the possibility
that judgment can be taught through practice.
David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31, 40 (1995).
26 Roger C. Cramton & Susan P. Koniak, Rule Story and Commitment in the Teaching
of Legal Ethics, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 145 (1996).
27 See id.
28 See Luban & Millemann, supra note 25.
29 See Phoebe A. Haddon, Education for a Public Calling in the 21st Century, 69 WASH.
L. REv. 573 (1994).
30 Many scholars have argued that we should use legal education to teach our students
about injustice and use clinics to pursue the goal of law reform. See, e.g., Phyllis Goldfarb,
Beyond Cut Flowers: Developing a Clinical Perspective on Critical Legal Theory, 43 HAS-
TINGs L.J. 717 (1992); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Two Contradictory Criticisms of Clinical
Education: Dilemmas and Directions in Lawyering Education, 4 ANTIOCH L.J. 287 (1986);
Abbe Smith, Rosie O'Neil Goes to Law School: The Clinical Education of the Sensitive
New Age Public Defender, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1993); Stephen Wizner & Den-
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Enhancing our students' awareness about justice, fairness, and moral-
ity also requires that we discuss those values more fully throughout
the curriculum. 31 Discussion of justice is not sufficient. I suggest that
the best way to teach about justice is to create opportunities for stu-
dents to exercise judgment.32 Through the examination of their judg-
ment, we can increase our students' self-awareness and help them to
develop a sense of justice. 33
II. DEVELOPING A SENSE OF JUSTICE THROUGH
DECONSTRUCTING POWER
Although the MacCrate Report identifies the need to do justice
as a fundamental value of the profession,34 the report does not define
what it means by the term "justice." A jurisprudential treatment of
the meaning of justice, fairness, and morality is well beyond this arti-
cle, but justice - however one defines it - is about the exercise of
power. In order to promote justice, one must be explicit about how
power operates, particularly in its subtle and invisible manifestations.
nis Curtis, "Here's What We Do": Some Notes About Clinical Legal Education, 29 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 673 (1980).
31 See generally THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS,
AND MORAL RESPONSIBILrrY (1994); Burnelle W. Powell, Lawyer Professionalism as Ordi-
nary Morality, 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 275 (1994); David A.J. Richards, Moral Theory: The
Development of Psychology of Ethical Autonomy and Professionalism, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC.
359 (1981); Henry Rose, Law Schools Should Be About Justice Too, 40 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
443 (1992); Terrance Sandalow, The Moral Responsibility of Law Schools, 34 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 163 (1984); Thomas Shaffer, Moral Implications and Effects of Legal Education or:
Brother Justinian Goes to Law School, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 190 (1984); Michael I. Swygert,
Striving to Make Great Lawyers - Citizenship and Moral Responsibility: A Jurisprudence
for Law Teaching, 30 BOSTON COL. L. REV. 803 (1989). For a discussion of the problem of
marginalizing professional responsibility within legal education and a proposed solution,
see DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY - ETHICS By THE PERVASIVE
METHOD (1994).
32 For a discussion of this failure to teach our students to exercise judgment, see
TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 4. We must attempt to enlarge
students' thought so that they can recognize multiple points of view. This is hardly a new
idea. Kant described it as erweiterer Denkkunstart. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDG-
MENT Sec. 40, at 137 (J.H. Bernard trans., 1966). Of course, expanding one's mind is not
sufficient in the exercise of judgment. For a thoughful analysis of the limitations of Kant's
view and an exploration of qualities necessary to teach in order to teach judgment, see
Luban & Millemann, supra note 25.
33 I believe that when people confront and understand their complicity in others' dis-
tress, they want to stop those acts that may contribute to that pain. Human beings do not
want to feel morally responsible for the detrimental treatment of other human beings. This
results in either a change in behavior or an attempt to distance themselves from responsi-
bility and guilt. Our job as legal educators concerned about the public interest is to make
the connections between the exercise of privilege and the reinforcement of hierarchy and
to reduce our students' ability to ignore the role that they play in upholding unearned
dominance in our society.
34 MACCRATE, supra note 4, at 140. See also Solomon, supra note 25.
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One way to approach learning about justice, fairness, and morality is
to teach our students the ability to deconstruct power, to identify priv-
ilege, and to take responsibility for the ways in which the law confers
dominance.35 With that understanding, we can also learn to use our
power and privilege in socially productive ways.36
There is an old Chinese proverb that says, "We see what is behind
our eyes." In order to learn about how to promote justice, the learner
must understand how power affects vision and values. The legal edu-
cator's role is to help students see how their experience affects their
values and how these values affect their assessment of the law. We are
essentially teaching our students the "skill" of compassion.37 I define
''compassion" as a sympathetic consciousness of others' distress with a
desire to act to alleviate it. As this definition implies, compassion re-
quires action; it is not merely empathy. It requires more than the
knowing nod and sympathetic gesture. A feeling of compassion
causes a person to act because of a desire to alleviate the condition.
The desire to "alleviate" another's distress, or to act affirmatively, is
the essence of the concept. In the social justice context, the skill of
compassion is the ability to appreciate that we operate with only a
partial perspective and to recognize that many of us, law students and
practicing attorneys, have privileges -most of them not earned
through any personal effort on our part - which color our percep-
tions both of the client and the legal claim.
We often treat our vision as if it were not partial at all. We are
not the objective actors applying neutral rules that the legal system
assumes.38 We can better promote justice if we understand how in-
justice depends on people's inability to examine how their own values
35 Paul Tremblay argues that truly "rebellious lawyering" requires the lawyer to look
toward long-term gains for the client rather than short-term solutions. This kind of law-
yering seeks to empower the subordinated client. Paul R. Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering,
Regnant Lawyering, and Street-Level Bureaucracy, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 947, 951 (1992).
36 This activity is not without costs. Often when people of privilege work to expose
privilege and use it to assist others, they are discounted or treated with hostility. For exam-
ple, white people who identify racism are often discounted as suffering from "terminal
white guilt." Men who speak about sexism risk questions about their masculinity. These
reactions only serve to expose the power and investment that those with privilege have in
maintaining the status quo.
37 The idea that one can strive for justice impliedly assumes that the law is not neutral.
Mari J. Matsuda describes a perspective that is akin to one aspect of compassion, that of
multiple consciousness. It is not the ability to see all points of view but rather "to see the
world from the standpoint of the oppressed." Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls:
Multiple Consciousness As Jurisprudential Method, 14 WOMEN's Rs. L. REP. 297 (1988).
38 Antonio Gramsci has described this phenomenon: "[T]he consciousness of what one
really is [entails] 'knowing thyself' as a product of the historical process to date which has
deposited in you an infinity of traces, without leaving an inventory." ANTONIO GRAMSCI,
SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS 324 (Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith
eds. & trans., 1971).
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may reinforce dominance.39 One way to explore this is through an
understanding of privilege.40 The MacCrate Report suggests that this
should be done on a personal level, uncovering privilege in our daily
lives so that we can effectively participate in the process of social
improvement.41
I use the term "privilege" to describe that "invisible package of
unearned assets that I can count on cashing in each day, but about
which I was 'meant' to remain oblivious. ' 42 It is conferred domi-
nance.43 It is the vehicle by which systems of power operate. Too
39 Stephen Ellmann describes this sensitivity as an aspect of empathetic lawyering. He
says:
Empathetic lawyering aspires to a vision of lawyers capable of overcoming their
own limitations of perspective so as to see or feel the world as other persons do,
despite the differences of race, gender, class, culture, or simply identity that divide us
from each other. The experiences and perspectives of the powerful, however, are not
the same as the powerless. To cross the gap-and to be perceived by one's client as
having crossed it-the lawyer generally needs more than just intellectual curiosity.
She needs some sympathetic identification with those with whom her experience
might otherwise separate her.
Stephen Ellmann, Empathy and Approval, 43 HASTINGs L.J. 991, 1003 (1992). I believe
that "sympathetic identification" is not sufficient to enable us to overcome our limitations
in perspective. It is only when that identity allows us to see how our own privilege is paid
off through other's pain that true change will occur.
40 See generally STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISIBLE
PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA (1996). We must also appreciate the importance of
constantly paying attention to context. As Jean Love points out:
In one situation, I may play the role of the oppressed woman among men, for exam-
ple. In another situation, I may play the oppressor-a white woman in a predomi-
nately white society, for example. At some point in time in our lives, we all
experience both the roles of oppressor and oppressed. We all practice both domina-
tion and resistance. Different though our individual experiences may be, we all learn
something about the impact of oppression upon both its victims and its perpetrators.
This creates a capacity for shared understanding of oppression. If we choose to talk
with each other about our experiences of the phenomenon of oppression, we will
eventually create a common language for devising solutions about the problem of
oppression.
Scott Brewer et. al., Afterword: Symposium on the Renaissance of Pragmatism in American
Legal Thought, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1911, 1923 (1990).
41 Section 2.1(c) of the MacCrate Report's Statement of Professional Values says that
in order to achieve the value of striving to promote justice, fairness, and morality, a lawyer
should treat "other people.., with dignity and respect." MACCRATE, supra note 4, at 213.
The Commentary notes that:
[T]his necessarily includes refraining from sexual harassment and any form of dis-
crimination on the basis of gender, race, religion, ethnic origin, sexual orientation,
age or disability in one's professional interactions with clients, witnesses, support
staff, and other individuals.
Id. at 214.
42 Peggy McIntosh, Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack: White Privilege, CREATION SPIR-
ITUALITY 33 (Jan./Feb. 1992).
43 The term "privilege" does not capture this concept fully. It is misleading because it
implies something positive and always desired. I use it because I am unable to come up
with a better word for the phenomenon. Peggy McIntosh is also troubled by the word. See
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often we focus on disadvantage as the sole result of power disparities
rather than recognizing that there is a subtle system of privilege that
necessarily follows systems of subordination. 44 We are taught to think
of oppression as acts of cruelty by one group against another group or
an individual. 45 We look for intentional acts 46 rather than "invisible
id. The literature in this area adopted the term and so it has become imbued with particu-
lar meaning within critical legal theory. The term has taken on an overly rhetorical quality
that often gives rise to a charge of being "P.C."; nevertheless, I believe that the term, if
properly used, adds clarity to our understanding of how power functions in our society.
In this paper, I focus on race, sexuality, gender, and class privilege. One can easily
identify other privileges (religion, ableness, etc.) and I would urge the reader to do so. I
hope that my analysis is generalizable. I am concerned with conferred dominance in which
the characterisitics of the privileged group define the societal norm, allowing the privileged
group to rely on its privilege and ignore oppression.
44 See Stephanie M. Wildman, Privilege and Liberalism in Legal Education: Teaching
and Learning in a Diverse Environment, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 88 (1995); Stephanie
M. Wildman & Adrienne D. Davis, Language and Silence: Making Systems of Privilege
Visible, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 881 (1995). Gregory Howard Williams describes his life
as a child first treated as white and then as black. His story starkly shows the effect of
privilege. GREGORY H. WILLIAMS, LIFE ON THE COLOR LINE: THE TRUE STORY OF A
WHITE BoY WHO DISCOVERED HE WAS BLACK (1995).
45 See HARLON L. DALTON, RACIAL HEALING: CONFRONTING THE FEAR BETWEEN
BLACKS AND WHErns (1995). Dalton points out that racism often focuses on race-based
animosity or disdain, but that such a definition is flawed because it is indifferent to ques-
tions of hierarchy and social structure; it applies with equal force to the fox and the hound.
He explains that a second flaw is that we do not reach the behavior of people who have no
malice in their hearts, but who still create and reproduce racial hierarchy. He embraces
Wellman's idea that racism consists of "culturally acceptable beliefs that defend social ad-
vantages that are based on race." DAVID T. WELLMAN, PORTRAITS OF WHITE RACISM 4
(1993). A definition that focuses on the search for acceptable ways of justifying racial
hierarchy has many advantages. It gets us away from focusing on malice or ill will. It
makes the racism charge less personally accusatory. It eliminates a ready escape hatch of
being pure of heart. Such a definition also mirrors how people of color actually experience
racism. Dalton suggests that people with white sheets are not the only ones holding us
down. Racism can exist even when there is no discrimination and no prejudice; all it re-
quires is the desire to preserve what one has and the capacity to form supporting attitudes
and beliefs. DALTON, supra at 92-95.
46 In fact, our jurisprudence has adopted this concept, as illustrated by the requirement
that proof of a discriminatory intent is necessary to establish that a facially neutral law
violates the Equal Protection Clause on the basis or race. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229 (1976). For criticisms of the intent requirement, see, e.g., Barbara J. Flagg, "Was
Blind, But Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory
Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 958 (1993) (whites fail to recognize that facially neutral
norms are transparent white norms that actively participate in the maintenance of racism);
Kenneth Karst, The Costs of Motive-Centered Inquiry, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1163, 1165
(1978) (motive-centered doctrines place a practicably impossible burden on the wrong side
because improper motives are easy to hide and result from the interaction of many motives
and sometimes several decisionmakers); Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, The Ego, and
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 323 (1987)
(racial matters are influenced by factors that can be characterized as neither intentional
nor unintentional, but unconscious racial motivations because of our cultural experiences);
Donald Lively & Steven Plass, Equal Protection: The Jurisprudence of Denial and Eva-
sion, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1307 (1991) (intent inquiry avoids unsettling race questions and is
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systems" conferring dominance to particular groups.47
Examples of "privilege" include a multitude of white skin privi-
leges-for example, the ability to exist in the world without being la-
beled by race.48 Therefore, we seldom assume that a white person
the sophisticated grandchild of the separate but equal doctrine).
47 McIntosh, supra note 42. This view of the world distracts people's attention from the
larger historical and contemporary context in which oppression is practiced. As one friend
puts it, we can ask the question "Are you a racist?," answer "No," and pass the lie detector
test. This does not mean that we are not racist. See RUTH FRANKENBERG, WHITE
WOMEN, RACE MArtrERS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF WHITENEss 242 (1993). Frank-
enberg describes this phenomenon as "power-evasion." Moreover, we point to individual
triumphs or advantage and use them to argue that systematic oppression does not exist.
Lawrence, supra note 46, at 321. Recent theorists have challenged the assimilationist ap-
proach to discrimination jurisprudence. See, e.g., Kevin M. Fong, Comment: Cultural Plu-
ralism, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1978); Gerald Torres, Critical Race Theory: The
Decline of the Universalist Ideal and the Hope of Plural Justice - Some Observations and
Questions of an Emerging Phenomenon, 75 MINN. L. REV. 993 (1991); Patricia J. Williams,
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Regrouping in Singular Times, 104 HARV. L. REV. 525
(1990). As Adrienne Davis says:
Domination, subordination, and privilege are like three heads of a hydra. Attacking
the most visible heads, domination and. subordination, trying bravely to chop them
up into little pieces, will not kill the third head, privilege. Like a mythic multi-
headed hydra, which will inevitably grow another head, if not all heads are slain,
discrimination cannot be ended by focusing only on . . . subordination and
domination.
Wildman & Davis, supra note 44, at 895.
48 Barbara Flagg labels this the "transparency phenomenon," and defines it as "the fact
that white people tend to be unconscious of whiteness as a distinct racial characteristic, and
so tend to equate whiteness with racelessness." Barbara J. Flagg, On Selecting Black
Women as Paradigms for Race Discrimination Analyses, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 40, 40
(1995). She says: "White people externalize race. For most whites, most of the time, to
think or speak about race is to speak about people of color, or perhaps, at times, to reflect
on oneself (or other whites) in relation to people of color. But we do not tend to think of
ourselves or our racial cohort as racially distinctive. Whites' 'consciousness' of whiteness is
predominately unconsciousness of whiteness. We perceive and interact with other whites
as individuals who have no significant racial characteristics. In the same vein, the white
person is unlikely to see or describe himself in racial terms, perhaps in part because his
white peers do not regard him as racially distinctive. Whiteness is a transparent quality
when whites interact with whites in the absence of people of color. Whiteness attains opac-
ity, becomes apparent to the white mind, only in relation to, and in contrast with, the
'color' of nonwhites." Flagg, supra note 46, at 970.
Sometimes the idea that only whites have no vested interest or no "race" has risen to
the level of court challenges. Judge Constance Baker Motley of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York was assigned to preside over a case in which
the law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell was being sued by an applicant for an attorney
position on the ground that she was discriminated against on the basis of her sex. Prior to
trial, the lawyer representing the firm requested that Judge Motley disqualify herself from
hearing the case because she was female and might not be able to deal with the sex dis-
crimination claim in an unbiased manner. The attorney also noted that because Judge
Motley was Black, she might have a heightened sensitivity to discrimination. Judge Motley
denied the request, stating that "if [the] background or sex or race of each judge were, by
definition, sufficient grounds for removal, no judge on this court could hear this case, or
many others, by virtue of the fact that all of them were attorneys, of a sex, often with
distinguished law firm or public service backgrounds." Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 418
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possesses the same characteristic observed in another white person. 49
Male gender privilege allows men to work without any concern by
employers that they may be limited by child care responsibilities. 50
F. Supp. 1, 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The lawyers viewed Judge Motley as having a vested interest
yet did not realize that under their argument a judge who shared their characteristics
would pose an unacceptable risk of bias against a female plaintiff. Other challenges that
have assumed that the dominant perspective is no perspective include: Paschall v.
Mayone, 454 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (defendants in civil rights action requested that
the trial judge disqualify himself because of his employment background, specifically his
civil rights involvement); Menora v. Illinois High School, 527 F. Supp. 632 (N.D. I11. 1981)
(defendant requested judge recuse himself because he was of the same religious affiliation
as the plaintiffs); Lindsey v. City of Beaufort, 911 F. Supp. 962 (D.S.C. 1995) (request by
defendant that judge recuse himself because judge represented "black student activists" in
similar civil rights case).
49 As Mahoney says, "'Race' as a social construction is not only produced by the persis-
tence of 'old' attitudes or ignorance, but by social processes that directly reproduce poverty
and segregation and then identify poverty and unemployment as features of blackness and
inner-city space and, therefore identify stability, employment, and employability as fea-
tures of whiteness." Martha R. Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness, and Transformation, 143
U. PA. L. REv. 1659, 1675 (1995). The concept of race is complicated, as recent debate on
multiracial identity indicates. See Bill 0. Hing, Beyond the Rhetoric of Assimilation and
Cultural Pluralism: Addressing the Tension of Separtism and Conflict in an Immigration-
Driven Multiracial Society, 81 CAL. L. REv. 863 (1993).
Peggy McIntosh offers 46 examples of white skin privilege and notes that this is just
the beginning of the list. Her list includes:
" I can, if I wish, arrange to be in the company of people of my race most of the
time.
" I can avoid spending time with people whom I was trained to mistrust and who
have learned to mistrust my kind or me.
" If I should need to move, I can be pretty sure of renting or purchasing a home in
an area which I can afford and in which I would want to live.
" I can be reasonably sure that my neighbors in such a location will be neutral or
pleasant to me.
" I can go shopping alone most of the time, fairly well assured that I will not be
followed or harassed by store detectives.
McIntosh, supra note 42, at 34.
Too often we think of "discrimination" in broad terms, such as not being hired be-
cause of one's race. McIntosh's understanding of the daily effects of white privilege that
have been granted merely by birth heightens white people's awareness of this limited un-
derstanding of the effect of race. Id.
50 Other examples of male privilege include the ability to deal with others with relative
assurance that the other person will not be condescending; to walk to one's car at night
without fear of rape; never to think that a boss's interest in you may be merely to get you
in bed; and to have others assume achievements are due to worth and not due to sexual
favors or flirtatiousness. Catherine MacKinnon describes male privilege as follows:
Men's physiology defines most sports, their health needs largely define insurance
coverage, their socially designed biographies define workplace expectations and suc-
cessful career patterns, their perspectives and concerns define quality of scholarship,
their experiences and obsessions define merit, their military service defines citizen-
ship, their presence defines family, their inability to get along with each other -
their wars and rulerships - defines history, their image defines god, and their geni-
tals define sex.
CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 224 (1989).
One can be denied some privilege, yet exercise others. Harlon Dalton describes his
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Class privilege allows us to ignore others' lack of health care, shelter
and public transportation. 51 Heterosexual privilege allows us to live
without questions about why we live with our partner. 52 For each cat-
own experience of privilege:
White skin privilege is a birth right, a set of advantages one receives simply by being
born with features that society values especially high. Although I can't claim skin
privilege, I have a sense of what it must be like to possess it. I am, after all a benefi-
ciary of male privilege. I didn't create it, I usually don't seek it out, and I am often
made uncomfortable by it.
DALTON, supra note 45, at 110-11.
51 For a comprehensive discussion of class privilege, see R. GEORGE WRIGHT, DOES
THE LAW MORALLY BIND THE POOR OR WHAT GOOD IS THE CONSTITUTION WHEN YOU
CAN'T AFFORD A LOAF OF BREAD? (1996). bell hooks notes that our notions of class
assume that it is merely a question of economic standing. In actuality, class determines
values, standpoint and interests. Law schools assume that a student coming from a poor,
working-class background is eager to shed that background and take on the dominant val-
ues. hooks notes that class status is never talked about in educational settings. She de-
scribes her own experience as a college student:
During my college years, it was tacitly assumed that we all agreed that class should
not be talked about, that there would be no critique of the bourgeois class biases
shaping and informing pedagogical process (as well as social etiquette) in the class-
room. Although no one ever directly stated the rules that would govern our conduct,
it was taught by example and reinforced by a system of rewards. As silence and
obedience to authority were most rewarded, students learned that this was the ap-
propriate demeanor in the classroom. Loudness, anger, emotional outbursts, and
even something as seemingly innocent as unrestrained laughter were deemed unac-
ceptable, vulgar disruptions of classroom order. These traits were also associated
with being a member of the lower classes. If one was not from a privileged group,
adopting a demeanor similar to that group could help one advance. It is still neces-
sary for students to assimilate bourgeois values in order to be deemed acceptable.
HOOKS, TEACHING, supra note 1, at 178.
52 Other examples of heterosexual privilege that McIntosh identifies include:
" I have no difficulty finding neighborhoods where people approve of our
household.
" Our children are given texts and classes that implicitly support our kind of family
unit and do not turn them against my choice of domestic partnership.
" Most people I meet will see my marital arrangements as an asset to my life or as a
favorable comment on my likability, my competence, or my mental health.
" I can talk about the social events of a weekend without fearing most listeners'
reactions.
McIntosh, supra note 42, at 36.
Other examples that occur to me include:
" I do not have to attend firm or business functions alone because of fear of
repercussions.
" I will not be prevented from making decisions for my partner if he is faced with a
serious illness or death.
" I can purchase a life insurance policy with my partner as the beneficiary without
any questions or suspicions. I will not have to provide a family member as the
beneficiary and then be required to add my partner through a change of benefici-
ary form months later. I am certain that he will receive the money in the event of
my death.
* I can purchase gifts for my partner without having to dodge questions.
* If I am fired from my job because of a specific characteristic that defines me, I will
have legal recourse.
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egory, there are many associated privileges for individuals who pos-
sess the favored ,characteristic. 53 When taken together, these
privileges create the construct of oppression for those who have no
access to those privileges.5 4
We do not experience the messages we receive culturally as ex-
plicit lessons. 55 Instead we perceive them merely as the way things
53 As much as we need to learn from others who are "different" from us, there is always
the risk that the focus on such difference will reinforce subordination. Brewer, supra note
40, at 1923. I am arguing for a two-sided analysis: First, we must try to learn from those we
believe are "different" from us. Second, we must analyze why we perceive them as "differ-
ent" and how that perception may reinforce existing power structures.
54 Marilyn Frye offers an analogy that captures this phenomenon. She says:
Consider a birdcage. If you look very closely at just one wire in the cage, you cannot
see the other wires. If your conception of what is before you is determined in this
myopic focus, you could look at that one wire, up and down the length of it, and be
unable to see why a bird would not just fly around the wire at any time it wanted to
go somewhere. Furthermore, even if, one day at a time, you myopically inspected
each wire, you still could not see why a bird would have trouble going past the wires
to get anywhere. There is no physical property of any one wire, nothing that the
closest scrutiny could discover, that would reveal how a bird could be inhibited or
harmed by it except in the most accidental way. It is only when you step back, stop
looking at the wires one by one, microscopically, and take a macroscopic view of the
whole cage, that you see why the bird does not go anywhere; and then you will see it
in a moment. It will require no great subtlety of mental powers. It is perfectly obvi-
ous that the bird is surrounded by a network of systematically related barriers, no
one of which would be the least hindrance to its flight, but which, by their relations
to each other, are as confining as the solid walls of a dungeon.
MARILYN FRYE, THE POLITICS OF REALITY: ESSAYS ON FEMINIST THEORY (1983).
An important aspect of privilege is that it defines what is desirable. Deviations from
that "norm" are less desirable. This reinforces the existing power structure. Barbara J.
Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy for Transparently White Subjective Decisionmaking,
104 YALE L.J. 2009 (1995). Flagg identifies cases that demonstrate white skin privilege's
effect on assessment of worth: Lasson v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 741 F.2d
1241, 1243 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099 (1985) (reviewing trial court's find-
ing that Hispanic male was passed over for state manager position because white male
chosen "had more management experience and ... his personality and leadership skills
made him a more desirable choice than plaintiff"); Clay v. Hyatt Regency Hotel, 724 F.2d
721, 722 (8th Cir. 1984) (reviewing trial court's conclusion that assertive black male "would
not fit into defendant's organization as well as other applicants would"); Leisner v. New
York Tel. Co., 358 F. Supp. 359, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (approving employer's decision not to
promote based on the question: "Is this person going to be successful in our business?").
See also Cheshire Calhoun, Sexuality Injustice, 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y
241 (1995).
55 Jonathan Kozol describes the powerful messages that indigent children receive in
school in SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1991). One com-
pelling passage illustrates the point that these are not explicit lessons:
In a somewhat mechanical way, the teacher lifts a picture book of Mother Goose and
flips the pages as the children sit before her on the rug. "Mary had a little lamb, its
fleece was white as snow ... Old Mother Hubbard went to the cupboard to fetch the
poor dog a bone ... Jack and Jill went up the hill ... This little piggy went to market
.... The children recite the verses with her as she turns the pages on the book. She
is not very warm or animated as she does it, but the children are obedient and seem
to like the fun of knowing the words. The book looks worn and old, as if the
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are.5 6 These privileges operate to oppress others, but, generally, when
privilege is exercised, the person is unaware of the role such privilege
plays in perpetuating systematic oppression. 57 Most people simply
live their lives trying not to act as conscious agents of oppression. 58
Protection against seeing privilege is a necessary component and
reinforcer of privilege itself.59 The invisibility of privilege allows us to
reinforce dominance without any moral accountability for our ac-
tions.6° If we are to treat others with dignity and respect and to strive
for justice and fairness within the legal system, we need to confront
that unawareness. 61 It is the invisibility of privilege and its supposed
inevitability that makes systemic change so difficult. Since the actors
are unaware of their privilege, they fail to accept moral responsibility
for their oppressive acts. As educators, we can help our students pro-
mote justice through unmasking privilege.
Unmasking privilege allows a person to challenge long-held as-
sumptions and to develop a healthy skepticism about law's neutrality.
Once we strip the facade of neutrality, helping our students to under-
stand the ways in which privilege operates, then those students can
never go back to innocent obliviousness. If we couple this with an
understanding that one's exercise of privilege indirectly causes pain to
others, then we can generalize the learning about privilege. This
learning experience can be the catalyst for the student and teacher to
continue to question the law's assumptions, to become more skilled at
teacher's used it for many years, and it shows no signs of adaptation to the race of
the black children in the school. Mary is white. Jack is white. Jill is white. Little
Jack Homer is white. Mother Goose is white. Only Mother Hubbard's dog is black.
"Baa, Baa, black sheep," the teacher reads, "have you any wool?" The children
answer: "Yessir, yessir, three bags full. One for the master..." The master is white.
The sheep are black.
56 For a discussion of the ways in which cultural messages are internalized and justified,
see Lawrence, supra note 46.
57 Flagg, supra note 46, at 958.
58 Iris M. Young, Five Faces of Oppression, in RETHINKING POWER 174 (Thomas War-
tenberg ed., 1992).
59 Mahoney, supra note 49, at 1665.
60 See Amy H. Kastely, Out of Whiteness: On Raced Codes and White Race Conscious-
ness in Some Tort, Criminal and Contract Law, 63 U. CIN. L. REv. 269 (1994).
61 Frankenberg demonstrates how this can be transformative. She says:
Attention to the construction of white "experience" is important, both to transform
the meaning of whiteness and to transforming the relations of race in general. This is
crucial in a social context in which the racial order is normalized and rationalized
rather than upheld by coercion alone. Analyzing the connections between white
daily lives and discursive orders may help make visible the processes by which the
stability of whiteness-as location of privilege, as culturally normative space, and as
standpoint, is secured and reproduced. In this context, reconceptualizing histories
and refiguring racialized landscapes are political acts in themselves.
FRANKENBERG, supra note 47, at 242. See also Judith G. Greenberg, Erasing Race From
Legal Education, 28 MicH. J.L. REF. 51 (1994).
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identifying privilege, and to become more attuned to the power dy-
namics that infect the attorney/client relationship and the client's
claim.62 Revealing privilege is a "transformative project. ' 63 If we can
identify how privilege operates and identify points in which we can
share our privilege, we can actually begin to fulfill MacCrate's injunc-
tion to "enhance the capacity of law and legal institutions to dojustice. '64
Power itself is not a negative.65 It is how power is used that deter-
mines its moral status. We are educating students to exercise power as
lawyers. For those of us who choose to raise issues of justice and mo-
rality, one question that MacCrate invites us to ask is whether we are
going to use this power to reinforce and maintain coercive hierar-
chies. 66 It is through helping learners perceive "invisible" privilege
62 This requires those of us who take on this agenda to struggle with those issues our-
selves, acknowledging, among other things, the deep effects of racism on American culture.
See PATRICIA H. COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS,
AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT (1991); W.E.B. DuBois, THE SOULS OF BLACK
FOLK (1961); HENRY L. GATES & CORNEL WEST, THE FUTURE OF THE RACE (1996). We
need to strive to confront the assumptions that poverty is the fault of the poor and that we
are powerless to change the plight of poor people. See CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, RETHINKING
SOCIAL POLICY: RACE, POVERTY, AND THE UNDERCLASS (1992). Our cultural experience
necessarily colors our beliefs about those whom we perceive to be different from ourselves.
See BELL HOOKS, KILLING RAGE: ENDING RACISM (1995). Those beliefs deeply affect our
ideas about our own power to effect change and influence our exercise of judgment.
63 The concept of "Transformative Project" is developed by Martha Mahoney. Maho-
ney, supra note 49.
64 Section 2-3, Statement of Professional Values, MACCRATE, supra note 4, at 213.
65 But see McIntosh, supra note 42, at 33.
66 The MacCrate Report urges us to "act in conformance with considerations of justice,
fairness, and morality when making decisions or acting on behalf of a client." MACCRATE,
supra note 4, at 213. See HOOKS, TEACHING, supra note 1, at 188. Harlon Dalton describes
the Race Game. His description gives insight into how power is used to determine moral
status. The object of the Race Game is to ascend to the top of the social pecking order. It
is similar to the children's game, King of the Hill, except that the Race Game is played in
teams. Once one team makes it to the top, the goal is to keep the one below from climbing
higher. Teams at the bottom have one goal - to climb higher and those in between are
torn between maintaining their position with relation to those below and trying to climb
higher still. Rules establish the racial pecking order and the way to prevail is to retain
those rules. Usually the existing rules benefit the ones on top, who use the power of their
position to keep them intact. Sometimes the rules cease to favor the status quo. When this
happens it is in the interest of the King of the Hill to change the rules. Dalton provides an
example in the admission to elite colleges. Admittance was once based on a broad range
of aptitude so long as entrants came from the proper social stratum. People of color, Jews
and White Christian commoners were excluded. Over time, various forces compelled elite
colleges to become egalitarian and as they became academically (as opposed to socially)
exclusive, they began to rely on standardized test scores even though tests tend to screen
out a disproportionate number of African Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans. As
the scores of Asian-Americans soared, many of the same schools suddenly began to look
beyond numbers and to take into account activities that reflect creativity, leadership, well-
roundedness, or other traits Asian-Americans were not thought to possess. DALTON,
supra note 45, at 68-69.
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that we can expect them to become accountable for their choices.67
Privilege is generally not something one can "give up." It comes
with the characteristic. However, unearned, conferred power can be
shared. If we assume that someone is more credible, for example, on
the basis of the privilege associated with his or her skin color, then
that person can exercise that privilege to benefit those disadvantaged
in our society by skin color. This is difficult because it is easy to cross
the line from sharing privilege to patronizing the person or at least
being perceived as patronizing.68 Nevertheless, when the situation
will not allow an oppressed person to participate or even to have ac-
cess, an individual permitted access by virtue of some characteristic
can step in. Without such sharing of privilege there will be no access
to the knowlege or power.69 One example of this sharing often occurs
in traditional law firms. A person of color enters a firm but is not told
the unwritten rules that are needed to survive and succeed. A person
in a privileged position shares those rules and provides the new arrival
with the necessary knowledge. Without that "insider" information,
there is a greater chance of failure.
When student attorneys represent poor clients, there are many
opportunities for the students to witness the sharing of privilege. Be-
cause of their status as lawyer/representative and sometimes because
of their skin and class privilege, they are given more credibility than
their client, who may be saying the same thing but not be heard.
These experiences offer teachers a chance to examine that phenome-
67 A necessary prerequisite to asking our students to take responsibility for conferred
dominance is our willingness to do the same. Most law teachers have substantial privilege,
be it race, gender, class, sexuality or professional. We must be aware of the ways in which
our own privilege blinds us to injustice and may affect the ways we treat our clients and our
students. Mahoney describes this project as it relates to racism:
Necessary steps toward change include attacking the power of whiteness as an invisi-
ble, dominant social norm; participating in the project (necessarily repeated) that
reiterates the existence of subordination and privilege by revealing the ongoing re-
production of white privilege and power; disputing the legal and social preference for
colorblind approaches that reproduce color and power evasion, protect privilege, and
deny cultural autonomy; and seeking points of unity and transformative potential.
Mahoney, supra note 49, at 1677.
68 Sometimes when privileged individuals seek to "share privilege," we attempt to
speak for someone as if she were not there. Stephanie Wildman and Adrienne Davis de-
scribe this phenomenon vividly in their essay. Wildman & Davis, supra note 44.
69 Not all privileges are created equal. Dalton distinguishes them by categorizing posi-
tive advantages as those which we can work to spread, and negative types of advantages as
those which, unless rejected, will always reinforce our present hierarchies. The key word is
hierarchies - we should not only be suspicious of advantages that reproduce the racial
pecking order, but should also treat as candidates for redistribution those advantages that
are acquired in part because of a person's favored position in the pecking order. No ad-
vance is possible until the existence of White skin privilege is acknowledged. DALTON,
supra note 45, at 115-16.
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non with their students and focus on the role of privilege in how one is
heard.
Sharing privilege includes a willingness not to be silent in the face
of behavior that subordinates a group. Stephanie Wildman offers a
powerful example of how privilege can be exercised by silence. She
describes being called for jury service. During the voir dire, the jurors
were asked to introduce themselves, and the attorneys were allowed
to ask supplemental questions. The defense attorney asked the Asian-
looking jurors if they spoke English. No one else was asked. The
judge did nothing. Wildman describes her response to the
questioning:
The Asian-American man sitting next to me smiled and flinched as
he was asked the questions. I wondered how many times in his life
he had been made to answer questions such as that one. I consid-
ered beginning my own questioning by saying, I'm Stephanie
Wildman, I'm a professor of law, and yes, I speak English. I wanted
to focus attention on the subordinating conduct of the attorney, but
I did not. I exercised my white privilege by my silence. I exercised
my privilege to opt out of engagement, even though this choice may
not always be consciously made by someone with privilege. 70
Striving to promote justice, fairness, and morality may require us
to face the discomfort of not remaining silent.71 It is these circum-
70 Wildman & Davis, supra note 44, at 892.
71 We should not be satisfied with increasing our students' pro bono hours. We should
strive for more. Thomas Shaffer and Robert Rhodes describe it vividly:
The burdens of poverty are fashioned in Wall Street offices faster and more effec-
tively than legal services and public interest offices can lift them. If you spend the
day on corporate takeovers and plant closings without thinking about the people you
put out of work, you cannot make up for the harm that you do by giving a woman
free legal advice in the evening when her unemployed husband takes out his frustra-
tion by beating her.
Thomas L. Shaffer & Robert E. Rhodes, Jr., A Christian Theology for Roman Catholic
Law Schools, 14 U. DAYTON L. REv. 5, 18 (1988).
Whites must accept joint ownership of America's race problem. First, they must un-
learn the many ways they commonly disown race which is done by: heightened rhetoric of
Black responsibility (Blacks need to become more ambitious, take education seri-
ously .... ); treating Blacks as if they were fully in control of their own fate (Why don't they
just get a job .... ); and turning the tables (the notion that White men have suffered greatly
at the hands of people of color and White women). Second, people disown the race prob-
lem by removing race from the picture (Black problems have to do more with class than
race). This is flawed because it assumes that race and class are independent. The cause of
many poor people's situation is not solely class but also the racial pecking order and race-
related indifference, which play a role in our unwillingness to do what is necessary to im-
prove the lot of the poor. Finally, rather than disown the race problem, many Whites
make their participation conditional (I'd be willing to help if you would only ... be less
shrill, get your own house, meet me halfway .... ). White and Black aspirations are not
necessarily inconsistent and if we take joint responsibility for cleaning up the racial mess,
we could search for creative solutions to expand opportunities for everyone. DALTON,
supra note 45, at 117-25.
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stances that may offer those of us who have privilege an opportunity
to act, using our privilege and credibility to identify the injustice. In
the educational context, as teachers, we have the ability to share our
own power and privilege in the classroom. We do this through our
curricular choices and the comments we choose to ignore and those
that we develop and examine in class. As members of an institution,
we share our privilege through our willingness to encourage diversity
among the faculty and the student body. We, like our students, can
recognize that our choice not to speak may reinforce privilege and
contribute to others' pain.
As legal educators, our own privilege - be it skin, class, profes-
sional, heterosexual, or male privilege - imbues us with certain
power that we can use to confront the privilege itself. One of my sad
realizations when teaching about race as a white woman is that my
opinion about race is given more credence by white people than opin-
ions about race offered by fellow black teachers. This is due to skin
privilege and the assumption that I do not have an ax to grind or the
faulty assumption that I do not have a vested interest.72 Because I
know this, I feel a responsibility to discuss race and racism as much as
possible. At the same time, as a woman, my voice about women's
issues is characterized as shrill by many men because I am perceived
to have a vested interest. A male's critique of sexism, however, is
likely to be more persuasive to those same men. This is unfortunate
because the phenomenon of privilege undermines the voices that are
most familiar with the ways in which oppression affects us. For those
of us who are deeply concerned about problems of oppression in soci-
ety even when we are not the direct victims, this phenomenon offers
us a role to play and a responsibility to play it. In essence, as teachers,
we are helping our students take off their blinders and recognize the
unearned power conferred upon them. Once the blinders are off, they
will necessarily assume responsibility for the perpetuation of privilege
because they will no longer be able to exercise it unknowingly.
72 At the same time, because I have skin privilege, I am less likely to have a full under-
standing and sensitivity to the effects of white supremacy. Harlon Dalton notes the phe-
nomenon of discounting black voices: "When it comes to race, too often the opinions and
judgments of people of color are regarded by Whites as subjective and self-interested, and
therefore of dubious value. We need look no further than the legal academy to see this
dynamic in action." DALTON, supra note 45, at 44. He cites some examples. In the legal
academy people of color new to teaching are advised by concerned White colleagues to
avoid dealing with issues of race in their scholarship so as to guard against problems with
tenure, while White junior faculty can write about whatever they want. They are ap-
plauded for quality work that is supportive of the aspirations of people of color as well as
for scholarship that is highly critical of positions associated with prominent scholars of
color. Id.
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III. A LEARNING THEORY TO PROMOTE JUSTICE
Teaching to promote justice, fairness and morality in the way that
is described here should be grounded in educational theory. Unfortu-
nately, legal educators have little or no training in learning theory.
Most of us rely on methods that we ourselves experienced in law
school. These techniques are not grounded in the specialized needs of
adult learners. Adult students come to law school already socialized
with well-developed meaning schemes, that is, patterns of thought that
control the way they interpret perception and construe experience. 73
These sets of habitual expectations operate as codes to form, limit,
and distort how adults think, believe, feel, and judge.74 Learning is
essentially a process of appropriating a new or revised interpretation
of the meaning of an experience. 75 Adults naturally tend to integrate
experiences that validate or fit their meaning schemes and discount
those that do not.76 In order to learn, therefore, adults must break
through preexisting patterns, allowing them to either validate or trans-
form assumptions that they may bring to a given situation. 77 Occa-
sionally, adults are forced to assess basic premises that they have
taken for granted and find them unjustified. This may result in a ma-
jor transformation. 78 That transformation occurs when learners must
73 MEZIROW, supra note 2, at 34. There is much evidence to support the assertion that
we tend to accept and integrate experiences that comfortably fit our frame of reference
and to discount those that do not. It appears that this process is not so much a matter of
matching new information with stored information or reconstruing past events as a matter
of referring to an existing frame of reference or an already established symbolic model
with cognitive, affective, and connotative dimensions. Thus, our current frame of reference
serves as the boundary condition for interpreting the meaning of an experience. MEZIROW,
supra note 2, at 32.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 35.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 192. Mezirow identifies ten phases of transformation:
1. A disorienting dilemma;
2. Self-examination with feelings of guilt or shame;
3. A critical assessment of epistemic, sociocultural, or psychic assumptions;
4. Recognition that one's discontent and the process of transformation are shared
and that others have negotiated a similar change;
5. Exploration of options for new roles, relationships and actions;
6. Planning a course of action;
7. Acquisition of knowledge and skills for implementing one's plan;
8. Provisional trying of new roles;
9. Building of competence and self-confidence in new roles and relationships;
10. A reintegration into one's life on the basis of conditions dictated by one's new
perspective.
JACK MEZIROW ET AL., FOSTERING CRITICAL REFLECTION IN ADULTHOOD: A GUIDE To
TRANSFORMATIVE AND EMANCIPATORY LEARNING 168-69 (1990). These phases offer a
great deal of guidance to the teacher about both what to expect and how to help our
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engage in critical self-reflection, change their self-concept, and reinte-
grate the ensuing insights into life's context on the basis of conditions
dictated by a new perspective. 79 They reinterpret an old experience
through a new lens. This gives the old experience new meaning.80
Fran Quigley, a clinical law teacher, draws upon this learning the-
ory81 and calls this learning phenomenon the "disorienting moment" 82
- "when the learner confronts an experience that is disorienting or
even disturbing because the experience cannot be easily explained by
reference to the learner's prior understanding-referred to in learning
theory as 'meaning schemes'-of how the world works. ' 83 There are
three phases of adult learning when encountering "disorienting mo-
ments" can result in perspective transformation. First, there is the
"disorienting experience" in which a meaning scheme is placed in
jeopardy. Next, the learner engages in exploration of and reflection
on the content of the problem itself, or the premise upon which it is
predicated. 84 Finally, the learner enters a "reorientation" stage. Here
the learner creates means for coping with the problem should it arise
again.85 Quigley suggests that clinical programs that place students in
students move through the process.
79 MEZIROW, supra note 2, at 193. When this happens, the learner often feels uncom-
fortable and confused. This occasionally results in anger, tears, frustration or rejection,
making the learning process even more difficult.
80 Id. at 11. Not all learning is transformative. Sometimes we learn by adding knowl-
edge to our meaning schemes or learning entirely new meaning schemes. Id. at 223.
81 See notes 73-80 supra.
82 Fran Quigley, Seizing the Disorienting Moment, 2 CLIN. L. REv. 37, 51 (1995).
83 Quigley challenges the notion that the practice and application of law are "technical
matters of value-free representation" of a client's best interests. Quigley recognizes the
crucial role that race, class, and gender play in effective client advocacy. Id.
84 MEZlROW, supra note 2, at 117. According to Quigley, the proper role of the law
professor is to foster an environment in which these "disorienting moments" can occur.
Once guided through these three phases, learning results from the disorientation, rather
than the confusion and retreat. Quigley, supra note 82, at 52. As teachers, we have many
methods for encouraging students to reflect and increasing their openness to insights.
Teachers often accomplish this through the use of peer discussions, teacher-student discus-
sions, or journals. Each of these three techniques is detailed by Quigley. Although al-
lowing reflection on the disorienting moment, each technique can be problematic if not
carefully monitored by the teacher. While peer discussions are important in adult learning,
such discussions also pose the risk of becoming "confirming moments" as learners fall prey
to "groupthink," overgeneralize their disorienting experiences, and attempt to frame them
within existing stereotypes. In supervisor-student discussions, the instructor risks dictating
the experience rather than guiding it. Finally, journals isolate learners from the pressures
inherent in group dynamics, but there exists a tendency for students to answer questions
with the peculiar knowledge that the instructor will read their answers. Id. at 55.
85 Id. at 51. Once adult learners reflect on the experience, they must "reorient." This
means that each learner's prior understanding of the world must be broadened to include
this new experience so that future acts will be based on this understanding. Quigley notes
that the main advantage of the clinical law setting is the age of the learners involved.
Rather than withdrawing from the challenge of reassessing their world view, adult learners
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contact with real clients from a poverty setting provide opportunities
for a "disorienting experience." 86 Law students typically come from
backgrounds far more privileged than those of their clients. The stu-
dents' abstract understanding of justice will almost always conflict
with the reality of their clients' lives.87 Disorienting moments can oc-
cur anywhere, however, even in the traditional classroom. 88 Once
they occur, we educators can use them to teach about the personal
role of the lawyer in advancing justice. 89
The disorienting moment provides a wealth of material for reflec-
tion and reorientation. We can ask our students to identify what they
saw and felt about the experience. 90 We can ask them to identify what
assumptions about the law, the party, or the legal system were chal-
lenged by their recent experience. These teaching devices are familiar
to teachers. They create opportunities to analyze what the insight
means for each individual. However, reactive insight is not suffi-
cient.91 What does the student learn about the delivery of justice in
are more likely to face the challenge squarely. Id. at 55. This is a more intellectual phase in
which the student organizes the material in a more abstract way so that it can be used in
the future. See Luban & Millemann, supra note 25, at 59.
86 Quigley, supra note 82, at 53.
87 Id.
88 See Part V infra.
89 Jack Mezirow describes our role:
The relationship between educator and adult learner in this kind of learning is
like that of a mentor trying to help a friend decide how to deal with a significant life
problem that the friend may not have clearly identified as the source of his or her
dilemma. The educator helps the learner focus upon and examine the assumptions
- epistemological, social, and psychological - that underlie the beliefs, feelings,
and actions; assess the consequences of these assumptions; identify and explore alter-
native sets of assumptions; and test the validity of the assumptions through effective
participation in reflective dialogue. We professional adult educators have a commit-
ment to help learners become more imaginative, intuitive, and critically reflective of
assumptions; to become more rational through effective participation in critical dis-
course; and to acquire meaning perspectives that are more inclusive, integrative, dis-
criminating, and open to alternative points of view.
Mezirow, supra note 2, at 223-24.
90 We may try a social science or psychology lesson or carefully formulated Socratic
questions that lead students to an understanding of their own assumptions about poor peo-
ple. We can attempt to deliver a lecture about diversity, but learners have substantial room
to create distance. It is quite easy to assume that we are not the bigoted, biased people
who often are the subject matter of the diversity lecture. A prerequisite to effective teach-
ing about privilege is those moments in which we recognize for ourselves that our assump-
tions about the world do not hold true. It is only then that we are open to these insights
into the nature of privilege.
91 Stephen Ellmann has done an excellent job of describing this task: To teach the
student how to engage in empathetic lawyering. Clearly that is one of the most important
things we can teach them. See Ellmann, supra note 39. I am suggesting, however, that we
must go further. We must shift our focus away from the qualities of the client that create
differences to be bridged and focus instead on the student. We must exhort our students to
identify their own privileges that have allowed them to be oblivious to the experience of
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our society or about the general inapplicability of stereotypes? Mac-
Crate seems to be asking for more. It is at this critical period in the
learning process that I believe we can teach our students about how
they can strive to promote justice.
Reflection and reorientation by themselves, will not have a last-
ing impact on a learner's drive to champion justice. We must add a
step in the reflection and reorientation phase. Not only should we
help our students reflect carefully on the disorienting moments caused
by the insights into "different" worlds, 92 but we must help our stu-
dents in reflecting on why the moments are "disorienting. '93 This re-
quires students not only to analyze the world outside of them but also
to turn inward and analyze themselves. They must seize the moment
of their disorientation and deconstruct it. What is it about their own
life experiences that allowed them to form their previous ideas about
the law, the individual, the system? Why has their power and privi-
lege allowed them to be oblivious to the realities of the lives of other
people who do not share that privilege? How does their obliviousness
reinforce their privilege and assist in maintaining a system which may
have harmed their client?
If the students learn to identify the operation of privilege, they
will have learned a skill that will enable them to question many of the
critical assumptions that heretofore served as the underpinnings of
their decision-making processes. The process of reorientation in-
cludes both an understanding of the injustice that initially caused the
disorienting moment and a glimpse of our own role in that injustice.94
Our goal in the "reorientation phase" is not merely to create a learner
with a clearer view of the world. Reorienting to an understanding of
privilege will also allow the student to use his or her own privilege in a
responsible way: to lend that privilege to those denied it.
Confronting the life situations of those who are less privileged
may not always be "disorienting," however. Adult learning theory
suggests that we search for ways to confirm rather than challenge our
own meaning schemes. 95 This is particularly troubling when those
the poor. They must understand their own role in racism and class domination.
92 To understand the complexities of what we mean by difference, see MARTHA
MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND AMERICAN LAW
(1990).
93 Of course, we must also turn it back on ourselves. The value of promoting justice,
fairness, and morality is not something static that one learns and thereafter incorporates in
one's thinking and actions. We all are acculturated. We all live in the world of "invisible"
privilege. We must always struggle with this ourselves. Being a supervisor does not make
us the experts on privilege. Indeed, as often as not, this learning process will be joint: the
learner and the supervisor simultaneously grappling with the question.
94 HOOKS, TEACHING, supra note 1, at 102.
95 MEZIROW, supra note 2, at 224.
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meaning schemes are founded upon sexist, classist, or racist thinking.
These schemes color the way law students view the facts and merits of
a case as well as the students' attitudes about lawyering itself. When a
student displays a lack of compassion, these opportunties to learn
about privilege take on a riskier character. At these moments, I fear
that my students are merely reinforcing their stereotyped views and
that I will be sending them out as lawyers more sure of their incorrect
assumptions about the poor, people of color, and women. I call these
"confirming moments." In the clinic, we hear:
"He's malingering . . . ." "She's always late or misses the appoint-
ment. She must not think of this as important . . . ." "She doesn't
know how to raise her children." "I told him to keep all of his
records but he just doesn't listen." "She doesn't deserve. . . ." "I'm
not sure if he did this, but he did other things. Prison would be
good for him." "Those people just don't know how to take care of
their homes."
In the traditional classroom we hear:
"Affirmative action doesn't make sense. I didn't cause these
problems, I don't see why I have to suffer so that we can give them
[women; people of color] a leg up.... " "The law shouldn't be in the
business of redistributing wealth.... ." "Law enforcement has to be
realistic ... blacks do commit more crimes. . . ." "Restrictions on
abortion are consistent with the state's interest in curbing
promiscuity. .. ."
The common denominator for these negative experiences is a de-
tachment from the person or issue and an unwillingness to identify
with the person and grapple with power dynamics. 96 I find it ex-
tremely difficult to turn these negative experiences into positive learn-
ing opportunities. Students often are resistant to the process of
examining privilege. They sometimes view my interventions as high-
handed and "politically correct. '97 Unfortunately, these negative ex-
96 Psychologically, there is an impulse to avoid such transformation because it threatens
basic meaning schemes. Psychiatrist Roger Gould has identified five implicit assumptions
that get in the way of changing one's approach to problems. They are:
1. I may regret taking this action because it might not be the right act.
2. I may regret taking this action because it might disturb an important relationship
in my life.
3. I may regret taking action because I may fail and feel worse about myself.
4. I may regret taking this action because I may succeed and it will change my life
in a way that makes me feel uncomfortable.
5. If I take this action, it might disturb some inner balance and I might find out
something about myself that I don't want to know.
ROGER L. GOULD, TRANSFORMATION: GROWTH AND CHANGE IN ADULT LIFE 119 (1978).
As educators, we must help the learner identify the learning block that impedes
transformation.
97 See Condlin, supra note 1 (raising questions about the social justice agenda of law
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periences tend to reinforce stereotypes and cultural biases. 98 I worry
that they also function as "confirming" rather than "disorienting" mo-
ments. Providing my students with problems involving poor clients or
issues relating to racism or gender domination may create an opportu-
nity for a disorienting moment to happen, but I cannot be sure that
the students will learn positive lessons. Therefore, I am not satisfied
with merely placing my students in situations in which they will en-
counter such experiences; I want to guard against the "confirming
moment." 99
In order to offset some of the situations that may act as "confirm-
ing moments" within a clinic, Professors Mary Zulack and Conrad
Johnson of Columbia University School of Law devised an inventive
simulation. At the beginning of the semester, one professor plays the
role of a client who fails to show up for a pre-arranged meeting with
the attorney. The students in the class speculate about why the client
might miss the appointment. That exercise in speculation offers op-
portunities for students to air some of their preconceived notions that
the client does not care, is lazy, or expects a handout. It also allows
the students to hear other possible reasons like the lack of public
transportation, the lack of child care, the inability to afford either
child care or transportation to the office, ambivalence about pursuing
the case, and ambivalence about the quality of the representation or
the degree of respect the clinic will provide. Additionally, the discus-
sion creates an opening for students to learn a bit about their fellow
students who may approach the problem with differing perspectives
and experience. Often the possibility of other explanations and the
realization that others may see the experience differently can promote
a conversion of the confirming moment into a disorienting one. The
faculty member can ask the group members to examine how their own
circumstances or experiences might affect their assessment of why the
client was a "no-show." An added benefit of doing this is that it in-
jects this kind of analysis into the accepted forms of feedback early
school clinics and the problem of "political correctness").
98 See Mahoney, supra note 49.
99 Of course, the moment itself has no inherent character; it is how it is received that
determines its type. Anyone who has done direct service work for poor people has had his
or her share of "confirming moments." Ideally, we need a framework for dealing with
these. One way we might identify how to cope with such moments is to examine our own
experience. Despite these confirming moments, we still go on and do the work. Why do we
remain devoted to the client and commited to the work? Professor Abbe Smith of Ge-
orgetown University Law Center suggests that perhaps progressive lawyers who continue
to work despite these "confirming moments" do so because they are not motivated by the
particular client but rather by a desire to change the world. Roundtable discussion at the
Clinical Theory Workshop, New York Law School, Feb. 23, 1996.
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and sets the tone for the course.100
When students describe an experience that appears to confirm
their stereoty pes about people different from them, it is useful to ex-
pand the experience to generate many different perspectives to trans-
form confirming moments into moments of insight.101 Professor
Randy Hertz of New York University Law School, who supervises a
juvenile justice clinic, describes an event that was an excellent teach-
ing moment. 10 2 During one semester, a student had the experience of
having the mother of one of his clients go to the prosecutor and turn
her child in for a violation of the conditions of his pretrial release
order. The mother did this without discussing it with the clinic student
who was acting as her child's attorney. She was immediately demon-
ized by the student.
Rather than focus on the student's anger at the mother in an indi-
vidual session, Professor Hertz brought the experience to the whole
class. By opening the discussion up to the whole group, he allowed
students to add to the analysis of why the mother might have acted
that way. Initially, the students aired anger toward the mother. Then
they looked at issues of the mother's loss of control. They examined
the possibility that the mother thought that the child's attorney was
not helping her child and that the prosecutor would assist. The stu-
dents explored their own responses indicating that they would not
turn in the child and the reasons why they would not have done what
the mother did. The students compared their own responses to that of
the mother; they also noted that they knew of support systems that
might be able to help the child while the mother was unaware of those
systems. The discussion allowed the students to root out the precon-
ceptions that had led them astray in their analysis of the situation. It
also allowed the students to understand the systems in which they
were operating. It caused them to focus on their own privilege and
their background of privilege that assumed access to systems and in-
formation. Finally, the discussion started them thinking about the
ways to reform the system and themselves. Perhaps the best tactic to
avoid confirming moments is to open the discussion to multiple points
of view. Gaining insight through the insights of fellow learners and
teachers is a key component of learning about justice.10 3 Of course,
without a diverse student body and faculty, much of the advantage
100 Mary Zulack shared this idea at the Clinical Theory Workshop at New York Law
School, Feb. 23, 1996.
101 For more discussion of this idea see notes 172-79 infra.
102 Roundtable discussion at the Clinical Theory Workshop, New York Law School, Feb.
23, 1996.
103 See notes 172-77 infra.
Fall 1997]
CLINICAL LAW REVIEW
that could be gained from these perspectives is lost.
Because doing justice involves life-long learning, we can only be-
gin the process. 10 4 Practicing justice requires constant Struggle; it re-
quires being uncomfortable and is painful at times, and one never
attains total mastery of the skill. It is like a revolving door: As some
ideas get off, others get on. Even though some exit, they may return
to circulate again. The door requires tension, or pressure, to move
and keep moving. The disorienting moment supplies the tiny push or
catalyst needed to start the door moving.
The learning theory of transformation leaves many questions un-
answered. Are there ways to maximize these "disorienting moments"
and minimize the moments of detachment and objectification? Even
if we arm ourselves with the questions that will help our students in
analyzing their own privilege, how can we create circumstances in
which the learner can develop an enhanced critical consciousness from
the experience? Are there things that we are doing in legal education
that may be undercutting our ability to train our students to be aware
of privilege? The following sections explore answers to those ques-
tions in both clinical and traditional settings.
IV. TEACHING ABOUT JUSTICE IN THE CLINIC
Law students are generally remarkably unaware of what it means
to be poor. I still am surprised when I see mouths drop open when we
identify the total amount of benefits a person will get if we win a pub-
lic benefit hearing. More than once, I have heard a student say, "You
mean $312 a week, right? Not a month." Or when a student attempts
to find out about ties in the community to argue for low bail in a
criminal case and cannot believe her client is homeless: "You mean
you don't have any address? There has to be some place." Or in a
landlord-tenant case: "The judge didn't even allow her to speak... ";
"All her belongings were out on the street . . . people were taking
things and there was nothing she could do . . . ." Or in a neglect
hearing: "I know the baby was sick but she didn't have any money for
a doctor and she was afraid the Department of Social Services would
take her child away . .. ."
It is at these moments-when the student experiences first-hand
the justice system's effect on the poor-that students realize that as-
sumptions they have taken for granted throughout their lives just do
not hold true for all people. These experiences offer teachers and
learners alike chances to examine their own assumptions about the
104 Judy Scales-Trent describes the struggle to achieve commonality through powerful
vignettes in Commonalities: On Being Black and White, Different and the Same, 2 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 305 (1990).
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world and engage in reality checks about how justice is delivered.
Many argue that the most effective way to teach about justice is in a
real-client clinical setting.105 It is in that setting that theory and prac-
tice merge.10 6 It is here where the law student encounters a different
voice: the voice of the client.10 7
I was fortunate enough to work in a clinic that serendipitously
appeared to present more disorienting moments than other clinical or
traditional teaching experiences. 0 8 In 1989, the Arizona State Law
School added an HIV component to its general clinic.10 9 We designed
the program to provide free legal assistance to people with HIV, to
identify appropriate policies for the State of Arizona in dealing with
HIV, and to help community-based groups which provided support
105 See Auerbach, supra note 10; Barnhizer, supra note 3; Derrick Bell, Xerces and the
Affirmative Action Mystique, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1595 (1989); Barbara Bezdek, Re-
constructing a Pedagogy of Responsibility, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1159 (1992); Anthony
D'Amato, Rethinking Legal Education, 74 MARo. L. REv. 1 (1990); Cheryl I. Harris,
Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709 (1993); Howard Lesnick, The Integration
of Responsibility and Values: Legal Education in an Alternative Consciousness of Law-
yering and Law, 10 NOVA L. REv. 633 (1986). Clinical legal education has embraced the
need to teach about social justice as a specific goal. See Robert Dinerstein, Report of the
Committee on the Future of the In-House Clinic, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 508 (1991). Stephanie
Wildman writes about challenging privilege in non-clinical courses, using experiential exer-
cises. See WILDMAN, supra note 40; Wildman, supra note 44. I have tried to do this myself
in a course entitled "Gender, Race, Sexuality and the Law." I have offered the course
twice with approximately 50 students each time. The fact that this class drew so many is
exciting, but makes it all the more difficult to use innovative teaching techniques that may
enhance learning about privilege.
106 Frank Bloch notes that clinical legal education uses methods that are best suited to
adult learners and therefore most effective for teaching new skills. He writes:
Andragogical methodology favors participatory, experiential learning techniques-
for example, exercise, role playing, field work, seminars, and counseling-to rein-
force the important role of experience in the lives and learning of adults. The as-
sumption is that "the more active the learner's role in the process, the more he is
probably learning."
Frank S. Bloch, The Andragogical Basis of Clinical Legal Education, 35 VAND. L. REV.
321, 331 (1982) (citation omitted).
107 See Gerald P. L6pez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in the Life of a
Rebellious Collaboration, 77 GEO. L.J. 1603 (1989). See also Anthony V. Alfieri, Recon-
structive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107
(1991); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills and Sunday Shoes: Notes
on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BuFF. L. REV. 1 (1990).
108 1 first described what happened in this clinic in a presentation that I did for the
Society of American Law Teachers in New York City in the Fall of 1990. I made some of
these observations there, but have since done more reflection.
109 ASU had an integrated legal clinic with five or six full-time faculty assigned to the
clinic. The overal student population at ASU is remarkably diverse for a law school. In
the later 1980's and early 1990's, approximately 20 percent or more of the students were
people of color. The in-state tuition was low and attracted a larger number of lower-in-
come students than other law schools of similar size and rank. The school had embarked




for people with HIV.1" 0 The HIV segment was part of a general clinic
in which students had the opportunity to work on public benefits
cases, criminal misdemeanors, a prisoners' rights class action, and at
least one HIV case.'11 The HIV cases typically involved seeking pub-
lic benefits and drafting various documents such as traditional wills,
living wills, and medical powers of attorney. We also occasionally
handled a case of employment discrimination or health care or insur-
ance discrimination. 112 The goals for this HIV component were mod-
est: to educate the students about the myriad legal issues that arise in
the HIV context, both for persons with HIV and community-based
organizations. 113
In 1989, the majority of people who had been identified as HIV
positive in Arizona were white, gay men.114 As time passed, the
demographics changed to include a large number of people of color
and some children. 115 As was true in most communities dealing with
HIV, it was the white gay males who demanded and staffed commu-
nity-based HIV support services. 116 Since the Clinic provided legal
110 For a general discussion of Arizona's response to HIV, see Jane H. Aiken, A Citi-
zens' AIDS Task Force: Overcoming Obstacles, in THE STRUGGLE FOR LEGITIMACY: Ac-
TIVISM AND MARGINALIZATION IN THE AIDS CRISIS 145 (Michael Hallett ed., 1997).
111 The clinical faculty shared responsibility for supervising the students. We identified
areas and cases of primary responsibility. When students were assigned cases, they were
supervised by the faculty member who handled that case. I supervised the majority of the
HIV cases.
112 For an excellent discussion of HIV-related legal issues, see Penn Lerblance, Legal
Redress for Disability Discrimination: Bob, Carol, Ted and Alice Encounter AIDS, 24
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 307 (1994); see also Samuel A. Marcosson, Who Is "Us" and
Who Is "Them" - Common Threads and the Discriminatory Cut-Off of Health Care Bene-
fits for AIDS under ERISA and the American with Disabilities Act, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 361
(1994).
113 HIV touches all areas of the law. While much of the scholarly literature concentrates
on discrimination and privacy issues, HIV also affects such areas as family law, criminal
law, immigration and tort liability. See AIDS LAW TODAY (Scott Burris et al. eds., 1992).
114 At that time, Arizona Department of Health Services statistics indicated that whites
accounted for 86% of all AIDS cases, a figure higher than their proportion in Arizona's
population, which was 75%.
115 Arizona's demographics differed significantly from the national figures. According
to the Centers for Disease Control, from June 1981 to September 1990, 152,126 cases of
AIDS were reported. Although African Americans constitute 12% of the population, they
accounted for 28% of AIDS cases and the rate is increasing. African Americans also ac-
count for 73% of the total AIDS cases in heterosexual men, 52% in women and 55% in
children. SAMUEL DUH, BLACKS AND AIDS: CAUSES AND ORIGINS (1991). Among Lati-
nos the rate of AIDS is almost three times that of the non-Latino population. Latinos
accounted for 12.9% of the total number of cases nationally in 1981 and as of 1990 they
constituted 15% of reported cases. AIDS PREVENTION AND SERVICES: COMMUNITY
BASED RESEARCH (Johannes Van Vugt ed., 1994).
116 As Altman points out, AIDS volunteers "included a large number of people who
were politically aware, and would demand a role in managing the epidemic very differently
from that of the conventional health-care volunteer." DENNIS ALTMAN, POWER AND COM-
MUNITY: ORGANIZATIONAL AND CULTURAL RESPONSE TO AIDS 20 (1994). See generally
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services to the organization and served as the legal service provider
for their clients, the students came into contact primarily with white,
gay men, many of whom had formerly been relatively affluent.
The law students in the ASU clinic were varied in age, ethnicity,
and gender and represented a wide spectrum of academic class rank.
Each semester, I supervised approximately ten students, generally in
their twenties. Approximately 20-25 percent were people of color:
Latino, African American, and Native American. Eighty percent or
greater were middle to upper-middle class. There were equal num-
bers of men and women. None of the students identified themselves
as gay or bisexual.
Even though many of the students were attracted to the idea of
helping those with HIV (such cases were more exciting than doing a
typical public benefits case), some students expressed concern that
they might be put at risk of contracting HIV and asked to be ex-
empted from these cases. Therefore, our first goal was to educate the
students about the fact that HIV cannot be contracted through casual
contact. Very early in the semester, we offered "AIDS 101," taught by
a local physician who provided much of the care for people with HIV
and the epidemiologist from the Arizona Department of Health
Services.
I was not surprised that some students expressed fear for their
health, but I was very surprised by the homophobia 1 7 that a large
number of students demonstrated. Most of the students in the clinic
had never met an "out" gay person. They expressed astonishment
that these people were remarkably similar to themselves. Many be-
lieved that all gay people were effeminate, sex-crazed or mentally
ill.118 These students' beliefs coincide with what Marc A. Fajer terms
RANDY SHILTS, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON (1987).
117 "Homophobia-the irrational fear and hatred of those who live and sexually desire
those of the same sex." SUZANNE PHARR, HOMOPHOBIA: A WEAPON OF SEXISM 1 (1988).
Pharr contends that "homophobia has been one of the major causes of the failure of the
women's movement to make deep and lasting change. We were fierce when we set out but
when threatened with the loss of heterosexual privilege, we began putting on brakes." Id.
at 25. Pharr notes that "without the existence of sexism, there would be no homophobia."
See also HOMOPHOBIA: How WE ALL PAY THE PRICE (Warren J. Blumenfeld ed., 1992);
Anne E. Freeman, Feminist Legal Method in Action: Challenging Racism, Sexism and
Homophobia in Law School, 24 GA. L. REv. 849 (1990).
118 It is not surprising that many of my students held these stereotypes. The media's
portrayal of gay people certainly supports these conclusions. For example, the movie Basic
Instinct gave us not one, but three, psychopathic lesbian murderers. With few precious
exceptions, Hollywood's depiction of gay men runs the gambit from the flamboyant drag
queen (Nathan Lane in The Birdcage), to the "everybody's-gay-bestfriend-but-is-never-
seen-in-an-intimate-relationship" character (George Carlin in The Prince of Tides), to the
sex-crazed, deranged gay murderer (Al Pacino in the notorious Cruising). More often
than not, when homosexuals are shown on screen, they are relegated to minor roles that
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the "sex-as-lifestyle assumption.' '119 According to Fajer, a core ele-
ment of non-gay pre-understanding of gay people is that homosexuals
are defined by and obsessed with sexual activity.120 This sex-as-lifes-
tyle assumption also encompasses the belief that gay people "choose"
to be gay and are, therefore, not worthy of legal protection; 121 that
homosexuals are child molesters or actively recruit children; and that
lesbians and gay men are promiscuous by nature and incapable of
long-term monogamous relationships. 122
While most students are at least somewhat sensitive to being per-
ceived as "racist," the students in our clinic generally lacked any self-
consciousness about being perceived as homophobic. Their meaning
schemes around homosexuality were well-developed along the lines
Fajer discusses. Few had challenged these assumptions nor had they
serve only to heighten the masculinity or femininity of the lead actor or actress. See Vrro
Russo, THE CELLULOID CLOSET (1987); see also DEBORAH LUPTON, MORAL THREATS
AND DANGEROUS DESIRES: AIDS IN THE NEWS MEDIA (1994).
119 Coupled with the "sex-as-lifestyle" assumption is the "cross-gender" assumption-
that gay men and lesbians typically exhibit behavior stereotypically associated with the
other gender. Fajer offers the following example:
During an interview for a law teaching position ... I asked [an administrator] if he
had any objections to hiring openly gay faculty. He said he did not; he was just
concerned with "extremes." When I asked what he meant, he replied, "Well, I
wouldn't want you showing up for class wearing a skirt and hose." In one of those
rare moments in life when the correct response sprang to mind immediately, rather
than a half-hour later, I replied, "I don't have the legs for it."
Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Stereotypes,
and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 514 (1992).
120 Id. at 537. Francisco Valdes who concurs with Fajer, states: "Sexual orientation de-
notes only the apparent or actual inclination(s) of sexual or affectional interests or desires
among humans toward members of the same sex, the other sex, or both sexes. The term
does not imply anything about the etiology of sexual orientation as a social construct or as
an aspect of personhood. Likewise, the term does not extend to any behavioral manifesta-
tions of the desires it signifies." Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys:
Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex," "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-
American Law and Society, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 23 (1995).
In a strong indictment of this mindset, Fajer observes that "[tihe assumption that gay
people's identities are reducible to sexual acts is peculiar and insulting, particularly in the
context of a long-term relationship between two people who consider themselves married
and are raising children together. Our society does not perceive heterosexual identity
merely as sexual acts; we certainly do not view marriage as a formalized excuse to fuck."
Fajer, supra note 119, at 545.
121 There is substantial debate within the gay community about whether homosexuality
is "genetic" or a product of choice. This may have jurisprudential implications but, at root,
it should make no difference. Often the argument that gay people had no choice about
their sexual orientation carries with it the negative implication that if they could choose, of
course they would choose a heterosexual partner. That implication is merely a function of
privilege and ignores the existence of the loving and positive relationships between persons
of the same sex.
122 Fajer, supra note 119, at 540-42. Fajer notes that "[miuch of the psychological litera-
ture examining homophobia has concluded that support for the traditional gender-role
structure is a primary cause of homophobia." Id. at 617.
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had the opportunity to do so. When establishing goals for this clinic, I
had not planned on coping with homophobia.
Much of the legal work that the students did for their clients re-
quired them to confront the heterosexual assumptions built into the
law. 123 Without the medical power of attorney, for example, their
client's partner of twelve years would be unable to see him in the hos-
pital.124 Without a properly executed will, their client's treasured pos-
sessions would be carted off with the parents or siblings instead of
remaining with his partner who had participated in their selection and
purchase. 125 The students learned that just because their client's part-
ner was a successful, fully-insured business person did not mean that
health insurance was available to the client. 126 They saw the pain of a
couple facing the inevitable death of one. They saw the desire for
time off to care for an ill partner denied by employers who did not
consider this an illness in the family. They saw young men with bio-
logical families nearby, struggling to identify a healthcare representa-
tive or an executor of their estate because their family had rejected
them upon learning that they were gay and had HIV.
As these HIV cases progressed, the students also handled legal
services cases involving poor people in need of public benefits. 2 7 The
vast majority of these students had as little experience with poor peo-
123 The heterosexual bias in the law is most evident in such areas as privacy, marriage
and child rearing. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding prohibi-
tion of homosexual sodomy between consenting adults in private); Singer v. Hara, 11
Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974), review denied, 84 Wash. 2d 1008 (1974) (definition
of marriage which excludes homosexual and other same-sex relationships does not create
inherently suspect classification requiring strict judicial scrutiny); Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457
S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995) (felonious sexual conduct inherent in lesbianism was an important
consideration in determining mother's unfitness for custody of child). But see Romer v.
Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1997) (Colorado's anti-gay initiative, Amendment 2, violates Equal
Protection Clause because it imposes upon homosexuals a broad disability by forbidding
them to seek specific legal protection from injuries caused by discrimination). See gener-
ally LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW (William B. Rubenstein ed., 1993).
Many commentators link the deprivation of homosexual family rights with the judici-
ary's inherent homophobic mindset. See, e.g., Fred A. Bernstein, This Child Does Have
Two Mothers... And a Sperm Donor with Visitation, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE
1, 22 (1996) (noting that when families with homosexual members broke up, "the courts
often deprived them of parental rights - a brand of homophobia that continues to surface
in the 1990s"); Darren Rosenblum, Geographically Sexual?: Advancing Lesbian and Gay
Interests through Proportional Representation, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 119, 123 (1996)
(observing that "[c]ourts reinforce homophobia by excluding lesbians and gay men from
family rights such as marriage, adoption, and child custody").
124 See In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
125 See LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW, supra note 123, at 439-60.
126 See Benefits for Gay Couples, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, Nov. 3, 1993.
127 These clients were disproportionately Latina and African American women. Of




pie and women of color as they had had with gay people. However,
the students distanced themselves emotionally from their poor clients
more than they had with their gay clients. The students never spoke
of any identitification with their legal services clients. I noticed, how-
ever, that the students formed strong relationships and identified with
their HIV clients.
Most of the HIV clients railed at their treatment and demanded
that the students use the law to stop the injustice. Why did they have
to give up all of their privacy rights to receive public benefits? Why
did they have to stand for hours in line just to talk with a caseworker?
How were they supposed to pay for rent, food, medical care while
they waited to see if they could get public benefits? How were they
going to pay for those necessities even if awarded meager benefits?
Why did they have to go to a special clinic for medical care instead of
seeing a regular physician? Why were they subject to the whims of
the health department and not entitled to anonymity about their
health status? Why were they laid off from their jobs without any
severance or notice? Why would it take so long to get a remedy for
the employment discrimination that they knew was unlawful? The
treatment the clients received often outraged the students. They
worked harder on the cases. They tried to expand their clients' claims
to provide legal remedies for these harms. They talked of class ac-
tions, legislative initiatives, and using the press to bring their clients'
indignities to public attention.
Most of the questions raised by these HIV clients were questions
that could have been raised by any of the poor clients in their legal
services cases. I am sure that at least some of the legal services clients
raised questions similar to these, but the issue of injustice did not
color the majority of their conversations with students as it did with
the HIV clients. Because these legal services clients all were poor,
and the majority African American or Latina,128 it is not surprising
that they, unlike their gay male counterparts, did not raise questions
about their treatment. Such treatment was not unusual and was some-
times even expected. Nevertheless, when these same students dealt
with their poor clients, they did not express the same degree of out-
rage. A far more common feeling expressed was some form of
"blame" of the clients themselves. 129 Some students contended that
128 Some of the legal services clients may have been gay as well but given the restrictions
of the Legal Services Corporation, we could not handle cases dealing with homosexuality
and often were unaware of the clients' sexual orientation.
129 For an excellent discussion of our tendency to blame the poor, see Thomas Ross, The
Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79 GEO. L.J. 1499 (1991). Ross
contends that there are a number of broad-based assumptions that cut across all treatment
of the poor: A view of the poor as morally weak, the division of the poor into deserving
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their clients' predicaments arose from bad personal choices rather
than from any structural defect in the system.130
The fact that many of the cases tended to arise as a result of the
client's poverty created the risk of confirming some students' beliefs
about poor women of color. While the students were quite able to see
the injustice of an employer's unwillingness to hire a person with HIV
as an explanation for their client's joblessness, they attributed a poor
client's lack of employment to laziness or "malingering" despite com-
pelling evidence of race and gender-based discrimination. 131 A client
with HIV must have missed an appointment due to his illness; the
legal services client just "didn't care." Mere exposure to the client
and her legal needs did not affect these students as such exposure had
done in the HIV area.
As the semester continued, however, I noticed a change in many
of those students who were handling both HIV and legal services
cases.132 The students began to talk about injustice more often when
describing their poor clients' claims. They spent more time with these
clients than they had at the beginning of the semester. Their work
product improved, and the time they spent investigating and develop-
ing claims increased. As an educator, the question then became: How
can I replicate this experience? What is it about these cases that has
made these lessons so clear and generalizable?
Clinical legal education increases the possibility for disorienting
moments. One reason for such disorienting moments is the newness
of the experience. The majority of these students had been shielded
and non-deserving poor, and the belief that the eradication of poverty would require a
radical transformation of society. Women of color evoke complex assumptions embodying
the intersection of gender and race. Thomas Ross interjects that "[t]he experience of read-
ing this rhetoric [of poverty] may diminish the possibility for empathy. So long as we think
of those in poverty as 'them' and not 'us,' we are less likely to share in their pain and
humiliation. We can imagine that they do not suffer as we would, or that their suffering,
unlike ours, is inevitable or even deserved." Id. at 1542.
130 In the field of criminal clinical legal education, Phyllis Goldfarb writes: "[C]riminal
clinical participants, after extended interaction with a variety of defendants, may come to
see the misleading reductionism in summing up their clients-people with a range of per-
sonalities, abilities, and identities who are often living in challenging circumstances-as
'criminals.' In addition, the students' experiences with the people who are living in these
circumstances frequently lead them to be less than sanguine about using the word 'choice'
to describe the conduct of each of their clients." Goldfarb, supra note 30, at 735 (emphasis
added).
131 See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,
1989 U. CHI. LEGAL FORUM 139.
132 When I read Robert Solomon's article, Teaching Morality, I was struck by the fact
that he begins by describing a student in an AIDS Clinic who raises questions of social
justice. The subject matter does appear to get the justice discourse flowing. See Solomon,
supra note 25, at 507.
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from the reality of people they perceived as different. Experiencing
difference is often "disorienting." Real-client clinics are effective in
creating these moments in which the student attorney must "listen" to
the client in ways that perhaps have never happened before. There is
a subtle power shift that goes on in this unique setting. Frequently,
the client seeking free legal services is in a less powerful position in
relation to the lawyer. However, in a clinical setting, most students,
having never been in the role of lawyer with a client before, are un-
sure of themselves, eager to please, and likely to show more deference
to the client than they would once they become a practicing attor-
ney.133 This power shift creates a vulnerability, an opportunity to edu-
cate the student about many more things than how to handle a public
benefits case. It is a chance for the student to rethink assumptions
about poor people, gay people, women, and people of color. In that
rethinking, it also creates an opportunity to view these assumptions
within a broader context and to rethink the consequences of legal
actions.
Relying solely on a learner's inexperience to equalize power rela-
tions is not sufficient.134 Given the demographics of the student and
client populations, it is very likely that the client's voice will be from a
different perspective than the student's. 135 Most clinical programs in
the United States focus on the legal needs of the poor.136 Students, as
well as the instructors themselves, tend to come from middle to upper-
middle class backgrounds. 137 Many of the white students have never
had extended interaction with someone of another race. 38 Most are
unfamiliar with the problems of the poor. Usually, the client's life is
133 Many clinicians have observed this phenomenon in a variety of settings. See, e.g.,
Smith, supra note 30.
134 Not to mention disempowering to the learner. The process of identifying unearned
power and the lack of neutrality in law should not be a process in which we undermine our
students' self-esteem.
135 In 1991, 85% of all law students were white. African Americans made up only 6.3%
of the law student population and other minorities an even smaller percentage. Michael A.
Olivas, Legal Norms in Law School Admissions: An Essay in Parallel Universes, 42 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 103 (1992).
136 Dinerstein, supra note 105, at 511.
137 See Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Legal Education and Entry Into the
Legal Profession: The Role of Race, Gender and Educational Debt, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 829
(1995).
138 Unfamiliarity with the client's issues presents itself in a multitude of ways. Students
comment on the hostility that they feel from some of their clients, particularly if the stu-
dent is white and the client is African American or Latino. Their descriptions do not ac-
knowledge the negative history that shapes the present interaction. See HOOKS, supra note
62, at 102. They personalize this hostility as a function of the individual's personality,
which prevents honest, meaningful conversation. Many students enter these meetings
completely unaware of their "whiteness," but their client of color becomes emblematic of
their race.
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so removed from the student's experience that the student inevitably
feels detached and in control. The client seeks help from the student/
attorney, but that help is often provided in a top-down manner.
139
This risks the creation of a "confirming moment" in which cultural
messages about our poor clients are reinforced rather than critically
analyzed in light of structural oppression or the student's own power
and privilege.
The students identified more easily with the HIV clients than
with the poor clients of color because the students shared certain
characterisitics with the HIV clients, namely class, race, education and
age. These characteristics facilitated an identification that prevented
the students from remaining detached. Furthermore, the identifica-
tion with the clients made it more difficult to rely upon stereotypes
during interactions. These relationships flourished because these cli-
ents looked much like the students themselves. Most were white and
fairly well-educated, and many had been successful professionals.
Therefore, I was caught off guard as disorienting moments under-
mined their stereotypes. Much of the learning occurred with very lit-
tle intervention on my part. Mere exposure to the clients caused the
students to re-evaluate their assumptions. These clients looked,
talked, and felt like their peers, their friends, and their family. I over-
heard a student telling another that her client reminded her a great
deal of her uncle. The other student said, "So?" She countered, "But
Joseph [the client] is a homosexual! "140
These white, male clients had lived their lives with the attendant
gender and skin privileges despite their lack of heterosexual privilege.
Many of these men had not been identified as gay until their diagnosis
with HIV. Their treatment, once they were identified as gay and in-
fected with the HIV virus, was in stark contrast to the treatment they
had received before the diagnosis. They were acutely aware of their
loss of privilege and were quite articulate about it. They made it easy
for students in the clinic to see their loss of privilege. 141
139 The antidote to this is training in client-centeredness. That is not without complex-
ity, however. See Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Re-
finement, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501 (1990).
140 In some ways, this identification had the same effect as an unexpected "coming out"
by a close friend. For example, an individual is certain that he has no contact with gay
people when, to his surprise, a close friend reveals that he is gay. It is virtually impossible
to maintain the stereotype in the face of such connection.
141 Fajer suggests that "[a] story that combines new perspective with an empathetic rep-
resentation is a very powerful tool that can force the reconceptualization of a problem."
Fajer, supra note 119, at 522. Fajer's reliance on empathy evoking storytelling closely re-
sembles Quigley's "disorienting moment." Fajer admits that empathy is likely to fail when
audiences do not share the basic premises of the excluded group. Id. This observation
coincides with my conception of the "confirming moment."
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This may explain the difficulty the students experienced in estab-
lishing similar relationships with their legal services clientele, who
were primarily poor women of color. Because these clients differed
from the students in a number of ways, and because poor women of
color in the United States bear the burden of a complex and multi-
layered host of stereotypes, 142 the students may have felt over-
whelmed by the many vectors of privilege that separated them from
their clients. That sense of "difference" may have reinforced the need
for distance and an unwillingness to re-examine multiple meaning
schemes. But did this mean that in order to confront privilege, the
adult learner should confront no more than one disorientation at any
one time? Did the fact that the poor clients often differed from the
students on more than one axis impede the students' ability to engage
in transformational learning?
Identification with the client was not the only phenomenon I ob-
served in the HIV setting. I also noticed a lessening of the power
imbalance between the student and client.143 This may have been
partly due to the similarity between client and attorney but also it
appeared to be connected to the degree of emotion that attended their
dealings. The student's proximity to the client's pain increased the
occurrence of "disorienting moments. ' 144 Basic assumptions about
the world were in jeopardy. This allowed us the opportunity to ex-
plore the sense of disorientation, to identify those assumptions that
appeared to be untrue, and, finally, to see why the students held those
assumptions. These young clients had a disease that certainly would
shorten their lives. In a few instances, they died while we were pro-
viding them with legal services. The students, young themselves, were
challenged emotionally by the tragedy. This appeared to have the ef-
142 And, much the same as homophobia is affirmed judicially, the rhetoric of poverty is
reinforced by a "special plea of judicial helplessness." Ross, supra note 129, at 1511. In
addition to these broad-based assumptions, case-specific assumptions arise depending on
the public benefit sought: AFDC recipients are assumed to have no aspirations beyond
maximizing their partakings from the public trough, disability benefits recipients are ac-
cused of fraud, and food stamps recipients are assumed to cheat the system. Id. at 1518-35.
143 Stephen Ellmann writes about the importance of respect in the attorney/client rela-
tionship. Respect implies an equalization of power. As Ellman states, "[T]he lawyer sig-
nals her common humanity with her client by responding to his views with views of her
own, by engaging him rather than distancing him." Ellmann, supra note 39, at 1000.
144 Professor Martin Guggenheim of New York University Law School notes that the
difference between the clinic and the classroom is that in the class, we can experience how
the rules might be unfair and in the clinic we study how it feels to be the recipient of those
rules. He knows his students have experienced a "disorienting moment" when the student
comes back from an encounter and says, "How could they have done that to us?" The
event happens to the client but due to the identity between the student and the client, it is
experienced as happening to both of them. Roundtable discussion at the Clinical Theory
Workshop, New York Law School, Feb. 23, 1996.
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fect of correcting the power imbalance between lawyer and client.
The students struggled with their own emotions and the sense of loss
prompted by the imminence of the client's death. Such emotional tur-
moil also created a willingness to engage in self-reflection and an
openness to learning about privilege. 145
The nature of the legal claims in the HIV setting frequently en-
gendered "disorienting moments" because the claims presented op-
portunities to question the law's neutrality. Unlike poverty cases in
which the law is well-settled and has deeply entrenched and unques-
tioned values, the law in the HIV area was developing and new. 146 A
large part of the work that the students did for these clients dealt with
their relationships. Nearly all of the ways that the law handles non-
blood relations presumes a heterosexual spouse. 147 Matters of great
importance to these clients, such as who would attend to them when
they were hospitalized, who would make the decision to withdraw life
support, who would care for their children and their pets upon their
deaths, required the students to create legal documents to correct the
law's default position. Students enhanced their understanding of the
legal status of homosexuality as they realized that the law's default
position denied their clients rights that most took as fundamental. 148
Most of the students were deeply moved and troubled by the fact that
the law made no room for the needs of their clients. They began to
develop understanding and compassion for gay people.
The students were gaining insight about injustice from their HIV
cases. The gay white male clients articulated the nature of the oppres-
sion they experienced. The students learned to understand how the
law, which they had previously viewed as neutral, reinforced the op-
pression.149 They began to be more critical of the law and less ac-
145 Shauna Van Praagh describes the powerful effect of narrative on a student's ability to
learn. She identifies three characteristics of narrative that make it a particularly powerful
teaching device. Those characteristics appeared to be present in the students' relationships
with their clients with HIV. First, their identity with the client allowed them to hear their
stories. Second, because these stories were a necessary part of effective legal representa-
tion, they were a weave of emotion and reason. Finally, because the students were over-
whelmingly heterosexual, they had to make room for multiple perspectives to construct
legal documents designed to overcome the heterosexual bias in the law. Van Praagh, supra
note 17, at 117.
146 Jane H. Aiken & Michael Musheno, Why Have-Nots Win in the HIV Litigation
Arena: Sociolegal Dynamics of Extreme Cases, 16 LAW & POL'Y REV. 3 (1994).
147 See generally LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW, supra note 123, Chapters 5 & 6;
Sexual Orientation and the Law: A Selective Bibliography on Homosexuality and the Law,
1969-1993, 86 L. LIB. J. 1 (1994).
148 See THE LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES READER (Henry Abelove et al. eds., 1993).
149 Phyllis Goldfarb writes about the power of narrative in enhancing the lawyer-client
relationship. See Phyllis Goldfarb, A Clinic Runs Through It, 1 CLIN. L. REV. 65 (1994).
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cepting of its purported neutrality.150 The students generalized this
insight and became more critical of law's presumed neutrality in other,
more entrenched areas. They began to understand that their insis-
tence that the law was value-free and neutral reinforced the marginal-
ization of their clients. Once this window was opened to them, they
could not go back to a faithful belief in law's neutrality. All laws were
now suspect.
I took the opportunity that this contrast gave me to teach about
privilege. The students described lots of "disorienting moments" in
which many of their basic assumptions about how the law functioned
were challenged. We "reflected" on our experiences and "reoriented"
our thinking. Together we strived to understand more thoroughly the
injustices that infested the lives of both HIV clients and legal services
clients. We spent class time and teacher-student meetings discussing
how the lack of privilege had made the legal services clients expect the
treatment and the structure that oppressed them.151 We discussed
why the HIV clients had the ability to articulate loss of privilege while
the poor clients did not discuss it in those terms. Most of the legal
services clients had never had class privilege. Their legal problem was
merely another in a long series of problems.
Another factor that may have contributed to the transferability of
insights in the HIV context was that the students were not the sole
determinants of what legal claims were available. They were not the
"helpers," with their clients relegated to a passive role of being the
"helped." There was a mutuality of effort that was not present in the
students' relationships with other clients. 152 Their HIV clients articu-
lated ways in which the legal system violated them and failed to meet
their needs. Their loss of privilege was a new wound, their indignities
fresh and oozing. They offered a critique of justice that the students
understood through their identification with the clients. Their de-
scriptions could be generalized. As a result, the students began to
make connections. They thought about the criticisms so articulately
expressed by the HIV clients and realized that the legal services cli-
ents were being subjected to the same injustices. They began to have
150 According to Valdes, "The legal permissibility of sexual orientation discrimination to
facilitate sex and gender discrimination is at once an expression and an exploitation of
heterosexism: it deploys legal heterosexism to absolve cultural heterosexism." Valdes,
supra note 120, at 124.
151 BELL HOOKS, SISTERS OF THE YAM: BLACK WOMEN AND SELF-REcoVERY (1993).
152 Much has been written about the importance of "client-centeredness." See, e.g.,
ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING, NEGOTI-
ATING: SKILLS FOR EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION (1990); DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C.
PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH
(1977); Ellmann, supra note 39.
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more energy, more compassion for the poor clients. I heard fewer
words of blame and more outrage. Instead of hearing me tell them
about injustice, the people who were directly affected by the denial of
privilege spoke to them. The authenticity of their observations made
it much more difficult for the students to avoid the contradictions that
such resistance posed for them.
Finally, the fact that their HIV clients had previously been safe
from these injustices undermined the students' security that their own
privilege was inviolate. They personalized the learning. The students
realized that if people so similar to them could lose their privileges, so
could they. Their newly recognized vulnerability fueled their desire to
promote justice. They also began to realize that the exercise of their
privilege resulted in pain for the client. Too many times their assump-
tions about how the world worked resulted in their being unprepared
to cope with the needs of their clients.
Teaching about this is difficult, but it is key to teaching students
to do justice. It is not enough to have the students understand the
reality of their clients' lives and feel sympathy. The analysis must shift
away from the client and the system and focus instead on the learner.
We analyzed the surprise that the students expressed when encounter-
ing injustice. We talked about why they had previously been unaware.
We analyzed who benefited from their lack of understanding. We fo-
cused on how our own privilege caused us to participate in those
indignities.
I offer a simple example of this process:
Student: "I can't believe that he has to wait so long before he
knows whether he will get those benefits. He's worried
that the doctor may not be willing to continue his
treatment unless he can be sure that he will qualify for
Medicaid. He's spent down all that he has and is living in
a trailer on the East side. He's got nothing to pay for the
medicine while he waits. Without that drug, he could die.
It just doesn't make sense."
Supervisor: "What doesn't make sense?"
Student: "That he could be treated that way. You know, I think this
may be why my legal services client has so many health
problems. She probably hasn't been able to afford a doctor
all of her life."
Supervisor: "Why do you suppose that you were surprised by this?
You have been dealing with Mrs. Winters (the legal
services client) for almost a whole semester and you have
never talked about her lack of access to health care."
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Student: "I guess I just haven't thought about it much. I'm covered
by insurance. I never think about what medical care costs
or even that it costs at all. That's allowed me to be
oblivious to the fact that a great number of people don't
have that access."
In hindsight, I could have been more proactive in my teaching by
challenging the students to compare their experiences with their
different clients. 153 I should not rely on that comparison taking place
spontaneously. When a student suddenly realizes that he has been
oblivious to the fact that so many people lack access to health care, I
should not be content with that awareness. The next question to ask
should be: "How has your security in your own access to health care
affected your client's access?" What I am suggesting here is that we,
as educators, should be forcing the inquiry. It is not enough to create
the opportunity for a disorienting moment. Without greater
intervention by the teacher, we risk creating a series of confirming
moments. The educator's natural inclination, reinforced by law school
pedagogical techniques that avoid self-reflection, is to focus the
student solely on the legal effect of privilege. Learners will not strive
to promote justice unless they understand how their own privilege
prevented them from seeing injustice as well as how their own
privilege allows them to benefit indirectly.
I have suggested that we may, through pedagogical effort, be able
to maximize the number of "disorienting moments" in the clinical
setting. Yet the replication of that clinical experience poses serious
challenges. Clearly this learning experience works best with a real
client. Does the client have to be "formerly privileged but newly
disempowered?" 154 This suggests clinics that serve specific groups:
people who have recently become chronically unemployed; women
newly divorced from men who have provided them with wealth and
derivative privilege; accident victims newly disabled. Certainly that is
an unacceptably small sample of cases. The importance of identity in
fostering a learning environment suggests that there may be some
pedagogical virtue in having the students physically resemble their
153 But see Trina Grillo & Stephanie Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race: The
Implications of Making Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (or Other Isms), 1991
DUKE L.J. 397 (pointing out the risk of engaging in white privilege when using analogies to
understand experience).
154 One might suggest that we need to include an HIV component in every clinic.
However, the demographics of HIV have changed such that the majority of those affected
are not the "newly disempowered." Indeed, HIV disproportionately affects the poor,
people of color and women. These are the populations that are in need of proactive legal
services.
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clients and share with them significant, privileged characteristics. 155
Learning theory shows that such similarities do facilitate learning, 156
a fact entirely consistent with our understanding of privilege. Our
world view is shaped by seeking out others of our own race, class, and
gender, and we assign difference a negative value. 157 This raises some
troubling problems in teaching about justice, fairness, and morality.
Did my students merely unlearn homophobia by dealing with upper
middle class, gay men, or were they simultaneously confirming their
beliefs in white privilege? Does this mean that we should seek to
match students with clients who are exactly like them except for a
single attribute or characterisitic? A partial answer to these questions
may have been provided by the students' apparent ability to
generalize some of their learning about heterosexual privilege to
issues of racism, gender, and class. For some students, at least, the
recognition of flaws in their assumptions or beliefs in one area may
make them more willing to question their stereotypes and judgments
about other groups of people who are "different" from them. The risk
remains, however, at least for some learners, that contact with clients
who share many of their own privileges may confirm their preexisting
beliefs about people whom they regard as "truly different."
This ability to generalize one's learning about privilege from one
context to another is a key component in successful teaching about
justice. Such generalization only occurred after the student
demonstrated a willingness to engage in critical self-reflection. First
they established identity with their client's pain. Next they recognized
how the limitations of their world view prevented them from
predicting their client's treatment. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, the students demonstrated a willingness to be self-critical
of the world view that had failed them in responding to the needs of
their clients. That willingness to evaluate long-held assumptions
about the world, coupled with the desire to avoid having those
155 Quigley notes that adult learning theory shows that adults learn especially well from
their peers. Peer discussions provide valuable opportunities for the exchange of
information and experiences. Quigley, supra note 82, at 57. Quigley's view appears to be
consistent with this observation about the students and their HIV clients.
156 Barbara Millis, Neil Davidson, Philip Cottell, Enhancing Adult Critical Thinking
Skills Through Cooperative Learning, in INrTERDISCIPLINARY HANDBOOK OF ADULT
LIFESPAN LEARNING (Jan D. Sinnott ed., 1994).
157 See MINow, supra note 92. Minow identified five common unstated mis-
assumptions regarding difference. They are:
1. Difference is Intrinsic, Not Comparison.
2. The Norm Need Not Be Stated.
3. The Observer Can See Without Perspective.
4. Other Perspectives Are Irrelevant.




presumptions harm another, appeared to expand the students' ability
to perceive that heterosexual privilege was merely one of the
privileges that shaped their lives.
An important aspect of the HIV legal clinic was that the student's
relationship with the client allowed for more equal sharing of power.
These were, for the most part, aggressive clients who wished to direct
the action of the case. Their skin and class privilege contributed to
that aggressiveness. The students perceived their clients as powerful
and allowed the clients to frame the nature of the problem. Perhaps
we can enhance the number of "disorienting moments" by ensuring
that our students' clinical experiences include situations in which they
perceive their clients as truly powerful and the directors of the
action. 158 In these situations, the legal work is no longer reactive, but
jointly proactive. 159
This does not mean that we should abandon the Legal Services
model of providing direct service to poor clients who are often people
of color. We must recognize, however, that the model requiring the
client to come to the lawyer often disempowers the client and
reinforces stereotypes that our students hold about people of color,
women and poor people. 160 "Confirming moments" occur with some
regularity. Disorienting moments that arise in this model are
fortuitous, often precipitated by the student's glimpse of the client's
reality-in the client's home or in court. When providing direct
service to poor clients, students should go to their clients' homes
rather than requiring the client to come to the law school clinic office.
Students should take all opportunities to be with their clients.
Interview them in their homes; wait in lines with them; attend
meetings with caseworkers, doctors, or court personnel; and, of
course, attend appearances in court and administrative hearings. If it
is true that students experience more disorienting moments when they
are not on their own ground, then venturing into the client's world
should increase the likelihood of developing a critical understanding
of power and privilege. 161
158 See Alfieri, supra note 107. One type of clinic that puts more power into the hands
of the clients is the community economic development clinic. In these clinics, the client
typically directs the lawyer's actions rather than playing the kind of passive role that is
occasionally fostered by the direct service model.
159 Louise Trubek writes about creative ways to lawyer for poor people that appear to
offer some of these advantages. See Louise G. Trubek, The Worst of Times. .. And the
Best of Times: Lawyering for Poor Clients Today, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1123 (1995).
160 For a critical analysis of power relations in the clinical context, see Michelle S.
Jacobs, Legitimacy and the Power Game, 1 CLIN. L. REv. 187 (1994).
161 Poverty law classes have had the effect of increasing the pro bono commitment of
students. See Catherine L. LaFleur, Surveying Poverty Law: Addressing Poverty Law in a
Required Course, 42 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 147 (1992).
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V. TEACHING ABOUT JUSTICE IN THE TRADITIONAL CLASSROOM
The insights from the clinic suggest that clinical legal education is
the only setting in which this model of learning theory is effective.
Although teaching about justice in the traditional classroom appears
to pose seemingly insurmountable obstacles, 162 there are, however,
ways to create openings for students to examine their values and iden-
tify their role in promoting justice. In order to inspire a desire to pro-
mote justice, fairness, and morality effectively, we need to design
opportunities for the students to experience a disorienting moment.
When disorienting moments do occur, we need to create room within
our classes for students to explore the moments, reflect on them, reo-
rient with the new information, and open that window of critical con-
sciousness that allows them to generalize their new understanding in
the future. Self-reflection is key: the students must understand how
others suffer when they ignore justice.
Traditional teaching methods inhibit both disorienting moments
and reflection, whereas clinics offer many opportunities for such self-
analysis. While the clinic thrusts the student into a world that is often
unfamiliar, the classroom is usually an environment that operates by
rote. Deviation from the traditional teaching model is difficult and
often creates resistance among the students. Legal education is essen-
tially passive, requiring very little of the flexibility and creativity from
the students that client responsibility demands.163  Many students
come to law school with the idea that professors should just "teach
them the law so that they can get out and practice." These students
act as if the law is a body of information to be learned in law school
and then used like a technical manual. This idea may be subtly and
unintentionally reinforced in the classroom. From the outset, law stu-
dents are socialized into a particular model of behaving that reduces
their openness to self-analysis. The appellate decision, the staple of
traditional teaching, reinforces the search for analytical "truth" and
reinforces the idea that law involves a process of neutral inquiry.164
162 Indeed, the doctrine of stare decisis appears to be consistent with the idea of rein-
forcing meaning schemes rather than reevaluating them. Once a decision about how facts
should be interpreted has been made by a court, there is institutional need for that resolu-
tion to have predictive effect. If the same facts arise, there is no need to reevaluate the
legal conclusions, they necessarily follow. That is essentially how meaning schemes
function.
163 Luban & Millemann, supra note 25, at 62.
164 As Angela Harris and Marjorie Shultz have pointed out, "Existing legal rules and
arrangements are not 'neutral'; rather, every legal structure or decision creates 'winners'
and 'losers.' 'Winners' can be comparatively dispassionate in discussing existing arrange-
ments unless or until those arrangements are seriously threatened. 'Losers,' by contrast,
are likely to be emotionally agitated by what they perceive as unjust disadvantage." Harris
& Shultz, supra note 20, at 1785.
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The students are rarely exposed to the raw facts that the court sifted
through to arrive at its statement of facts. Instead, they are treated to
predigested morality plays that justify the conclusion. 165 How, under
these conditions, can we create a climate conducive to the insights
necessary for learning about justice? 166 The goals are to teach our
students to be critical of their personal perspectives and to teach them
to understand that unexamined perspective reinforces the status quo
at the expense of many people. 167 How do we bring home that
message in as powerful a way as possible in the traditional classroom?
How do we create a disorienting moment in an entirely familiar
setting?
Legal educators can use a number of techniques to create disori-
enting moments in the classroom. First, the teacher must disabuse stu-
dents of certain preconceived ideas about the law and establish a
different kind of norm in the classroom. 168 This responsibility clearly
165 Luban and Millemann note the limitations of the case method in teaching students to
exercise judgment:
Moreover, we doubt that the casebook people are very much like typical people,
because selection bias populates casebooks with people whose disputes are among
the small fraction that do not settle. We doubt as well that casebook people are very
much like real people (a point to which we will return). Judges need to compose
their fact statements as morality plays to underwrite their decisions, and in any
event, judges and their clerks usually lack the art to write in three dimensions. Stu-
dents who cultivate judgment based on casebook people are in for a surprise.
Luban & Millemann, supra note 25, at 61.
166 For an excellent resource on legal education, see Arturo L. Torres & Karen E. Har-
wood, Moving Beyond Langdell: An Annotated Bibliography of Current Methods for Law
Teaching, 1994 GONz. L. REV. 1. Many progressive teachers have attempted to import
critical analysis of the law into their classrooms in courses on discrimination, gender, race,
sexuality, class, disability, or critical theory. See, e.g., Beverly Balos, Learning to Teach
Gender, Race, Class and Heterosexism: Challenge in the Classroom and Clinic, 3 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S L.J. 161 (1992); Patricia Cain, Teaching Feminist Legal Theory at Texas: Listen-
ing to Difference and Exploring Connections, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 165 (1988); Alice K.
Deuker, Diversity and Learning: Imagining a Pedagogy of Difference, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& Soc. CHANGE 101 (1991-1992); Freeman, supra note 117; Ann C. Scales, Surviving Legal
De-Education: An Outsider's Guide, 15 VT. L. REv. 139 (1990); Judy Scales-Trent, Same-
ness and Difference in a Law School Classroom: Working at the Crossroads, 4 YALE J. L.
& FEMINIsM 415 (1992); Morrison Torrey, Jackie Casey & Karin Olson, Teaching Law in a
Feminist Manner: A Commentary from Experience, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. (1990); Van
Praagh, supra note 17; Stephanie M. Wildman, The Question of Silence: Techniques to
Ensure Full Class Participation, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 147 (1988).
167 Angela Harris and Marjorie Shultz offer this insight into the disorienting moment:
"[Slupressed emotion injures the classroom experience indirectly - blocking learning,
producing judgments that are based on little more than stereotypes, and creating intellec-
tual and personal isolation. Emotion ruled off the official educational agenda remains un-
challenged, unexamined, and undisciplined by reflection and analysis." Harris & Shultz,
supra note 20, at 1780.
168 As Frances Ansley states:
It is relatively easy to conclude that a teacher should offer students a variety of per-
spectives, but less so to define what role the teacher's own values should play in the
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rests with the teacher.169 In the first year, the purported agenda in
most law schools is that we are teaching our students how to "think
like a lawyer." That injunction carries with it the assumption that
once one learns to "think like a lawyer," one has managed to achieve
that state of neutrality common to all lawyers, regardless of their
background and experience. 170 This is the idea that a distinctly legal
mode of analysis exists, and if applied to a given situation, it will assist
one in arriving at just results in a particular case.17'
One way to undermine that forced neutrality is to demonstrate to
students that there is difference among their peers. I tend to overlook
and under-utilize perhaps the best teaching asset I have. It is the stu-
dents themselves. Like the real clients that the students must work to
understand, the students in the law classes sometimes come from very
different backgrounds and perspectives. Wildman and Davis describe
the importance of making friends across categories of difference as a
powerful way to confront privilege:
A university is a special place, offering opportunity not only to
make friends, but also to listen intently to many others who are not
friends. This opportunity to hear differing views is particularly im-
portant in a law school, making a law school within a university an
even more special place. Law and justice are symbolic of deeply
held values in American culture. Law school is a place where we
classroom. My aim is not to convert students to my own personal position on various
issues. But I must confess to feeling certain that my own positions on some issues
are right, and in some cases I do want to change my students. I am sure, for example,
that more people in the United States need to learn the history of racism in America
and the profound way it has shaped our legal institutions, our culture, and our daily
lives.
Frances L. Ansley, Race and the Core Curriculum in Legal Education, 79 CALIF. L. REV.
1511, 1579 (1991).
169 Marjorie Shultz and Angela Harris concur with this assessment. Shultz observes, "To
get a class deeply engaged, willing to expose preconceived notions, to question received
wisdom, and to consider threatening new ideas, I have to get them to talk about what they
really think and believe about whatever they are studying. I can only do that if I can be
comfortable in the face of emotion, theirs and mine, and can help them to be likewise.
Emotions are entwined with thought and judgment." Harris & Shultz, supra note 20, at
1789.
170 See WILDMAN, supra note 40, at 139.
171 For a compelling critique of this assumption, see Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education
as Training for Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 40-61
(David Kairys ed., 1990). The first year of law school seems single-mindedly designed to
reinforce this idea. First-year law students are particularly unwilling to break norms that
are clearly established in their classes. Therefore, in order to teach about justice, I have
found that I must undermine this premise of neutrality that is constantly reinforced in the
other required courses that a first-year student is taking. Once "trained," they are resistant
to different norms in upper-division courses. This is complicated by the fact that I am often
the only female professor they have. The students tend to discount my approach as
"touchy-feely" or "feminist," which diminishes my ability to challenge the neutrality prem-
ise in an effective manner.
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should be able to think about systems of privilege and the role of
law in maintaining or constraining power.172
If we, as teachers, create circumstances in which the learner's per-
spective is valued in the class and is not merely a frolic in an otherwise
detached analytical discussion, then we can create opportunities for
disorienting moments. Although students are generally discouraged
from sharing personal information about themselves and applying
their own sense of justice to legal problems, teachers can encourage
learners to do so by offering their own particular insights in class.173
Peer pressure not to be personal may, however, be so strong that
we cannot defeat the law school norm by merely encouraging students
to reflect openly in the classroom. The key then is to create opportuni-
ties for learners to use their own sense of justice in analyzing legal
problems and to make that a part of the "normal" discussion. This
can be done in a number of ways: small group projects or simulations,
small group discussions in which the learners offer their own perspec-
tives on particular issues, and large class discussions in which the
teacher asks questions that specifically solicit students' personal in-
sights. Occasionally, the disorienting moment occurs. The students
sometimes find themselves surprised at an insight and perspective of-
fered by a peer because they did not realize that anyone in the class
came from that background or because they had always assumed that
everyone (at least in law school) shared their perspective on the par-
ticular issue. These experiences often leave the students disoriented
and ripe for gaining insights about justice.
In a civil rights course, we were analyzing why class status would
not be a suspect classification under the traditional equal protection
clause. One of the primary reasons cited by the students from the
case materials was the notion that class, unlike race and gender, is
changeable. One student raised her hand and began to tell the story
of her childhood. She was raised with four siblings in a very small
home with no electricity or plumbing. She described studying by can-
dlelight and going whole days without eating because there was no
money for the family. Her mother raised the family alone, and, inter-
mittently, she qualified for aid and food stamps. She could not afford
any child care, and the children looked after each other when their
mother was able to find work. The class was silent throughout this
disclosure. I saw looks of surprise and embarrassment for her. Tears
were evident on many faces. I believe that the moment was quite dis-
orienting. Several students told me later that they had always as-
sumed that everyone in the class was just like they were and had been
172 Wildman and Davis, supra note 44, at 884.
173 See Harris & Shultz, supra note 20.
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raised in middle-class homes. They were taken aback that their as-
sumptions about their peers had been untrue. They could no longer
rely on those assumptions.
After the student concluded her description of the poverty in
which she grew up, another student noted that her story proved the
rule that class was a changeable characteristic because here she was in
law school and breaking the cycle of poverty. Many people nodded
and smiled. The student broke in and said, "You don't get it, do you?
I'll never be able to get out of poverty. I still have three sisters and a
mother at home. They still need me. They still live in the poverty I
described. I guess I could abandon them, but I will not do that. So
every cent I make over my living expenses goes to them to help them
survive. No, I haven't escaped poverty .... I will always be poor."
That insight, offered so painfully and personally, did more than any
readings or lecture could to expose the fallacy of the view that poverty
is escapable by anyone willing to work hard.
The disorienting moment is not enough. This is an opportunity to
have the learner reflect on how her own values affected her analysis of
the problem and, consequently, the delivery of justice. This kind of
reflection is often difficult to accomplish because there is discomfort
in the classroom and tension not just for the students but also for me.
Nevertheless, I have learned that you cannot let the moment fade.
There are so few of them, and the learning does not occur later, once
the students have had a chance to process the experience and succumb
to cognitive dissonance. I ask the same questions that I would ask in
the clinical setting. I name the experience in class: "Many of you ap-
pear moved and surprised by this story. Why were we surprised by
what we learned? What structural realities of our lives encouraged us
to believe the Horatio Alger myth? 174 How are the law and society
affected by the idea that poverty is escapable? Who benefits from
that belief?" In addition to this kind of analysis, I attempt to lead the
students into an even more self-reflective mode. I ask them: "How
does believing that everyone is like you influence your ability to be
effective lawyers? How do you benefit from the belief that your class
174 Harlon Dalton describes the influence of the Horatio Alger myth on race relations in
our country. He notes that the Horatio Alger myth conveys three basic messages: 1) Each
person is judged solely on their own merits; 2) We each have a fair opportunity to develop
those merits; and 3) Ultimately, merit will out. There is a fundamental tension between the
promise of opportunity enshrined in the Alger myth and the realities of a racial caste sys-
tem. By rejecting the Alger myth we reveal the untruth that blacks can simply lift them-
selves up by the bootstraps and drive home the realization that hard work and individual
merit do not necessarily produce success. Exposure of the fallacies of the myth also may
cause white people to realize that their own achievements have been helped along by their
preferred social position. DALTON, supra note 45, at 127-35.
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status is earned? How does that belief affect current local and na-
tional policy initiatives? 175 How are poor people harmed by that
belief?"
Another classroom norm that gets in the way of discussions of
justice is the limited opportunity for self-critique and reflection.
Sometimes, students and I make comments that reveal our assump-
tions about the world and evidence our various biases. These kinds of
comments, obviously, need to be handled delicately so as not to alien-
ate the student and send a message to other learners that they might
be attacked if they are candid in their comments. One of the ways I
open the possibility of examining these comments is to use my own
"slips of privilege" as fodder for class discussion. Once I show how it
happens unintentionally (even to the teacher!), the learners become
more willing to analyze their own experiences. 176 What I have found
is that the more subtle the example, the better. Comments that reflect
overt racism or sexism are too easy to dismiss as idiosyncratic. 177
I offer an example of an analysis I did with my class of my own
exercise of privilege. I testified before the South Carolina General
Assembly in opposition to a bill that would prevent the acknowledg-
ment of marriages between people of the same sex performed in other
states. One of my strategies was to try to convince the legislature that
they need not act on this law because gay marriages had not yet been
recognized in any state and we were at least two years away from that
event. I suggested that we could thereby avoid setting ourselves up
for costly litigation, leaving those costs to other states to pay and act-
ing later if necessary. When talking with my class about the constitu-
tionality of such a bill, I told them about my testimony. I said, "It is
not a problem yet, we don't need to fix it." At the moment I said that,
I realized that I had engaged in heterosexual privilege. I had charac-
terized same-sex marriage as a problem. I stopped the class and I
pointed out my choice of words and asked the class: "If I had a com-
mitted relationship with someone of the same sex, would I have char-
acterized same-sex marriage as a problem? Who benefits from that
175 1 copy portions of the CONTRACT WITH AMERICA for the students and ask them to
analyze the assumptions within the sections. Many of the students who have heard about
the document but have never read any of it are stunned by its content.
176 Modeling is a key technique in demonstrating to students how they can incorporate
critical self-consciousness of privilege. Norman Redlich says: "We teach best by example,
and nothing which the law professor says in class with regard to professional standards can
equal in impact the effect of the professor's own conduct." Norman Redlich, Professional
Responsibility of Law Teachers, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 623, 623-624 (1980). For a discussion
of the importance of modeling in our teaching, see Jacobs, supra note 160, at 187.
177 Marjorie Shultz and Angela Harris offer terrific examples of circumstances in which
they have examined their own and their students' comments for the power assumptions
they embody. See Harris & Shultz, supra note 20, at 1788-92.
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characterization? How does that characterization reinforce the
marginalization of gay people?" I took pains to show them that my
choice of words was not intended to have that effect, but that it was
important for me to recognize the effect and work from there.
Once students go through an exercise in which I am the focal
point, they appear less threatened by a similar analysis of their own
comments. The O.J. Simpson case has been rich in many ways. Per-
haps its greatest richness, however, is the degree to which uncon-
scious privilege reveals itself in our very descriptions of the case.
Before the case went to trial, it came up in my civil rights class, and we
began a discussion of whether racism was involved in the case. One
white student said, "O.J. has transcended race." This comment set off
a flurry of hands from the African American students. One African
American student pointed out that O.J. Simpson had only tran-
scended race as long as everyone knew who he was. If he were en-
countered on the street by someone unfamiliar with him, then he was
just a big, black male who embodied all the stereotypes that go along
with that description. That point was understood by the class. I did
not want to leave it at that, however. The choice of words was too
useful as a lesson in hidden privilege. I drew a horizonal line on the
board and wrote black under the line and a vertical arrow pointing up
and over the line. I asked the class, "What do we mean by using the
term 'transcended'? What did O.J. Simpson become? What had he
moved above? What hidden assumptions were included in the use of
the word 'transcended'? Who benefits from that characterization?"
The subtlety of the comment assisted in the "disorienting moment."
Most of the people in the room, whatever their color, could see them-
selves using the term "transcending race." It was only then, upon re-
flection and reorientation, that the negative image was revealed.
One way to create room for students to bring their own values to
the subject matter is to require that students keep a journal. Journals
offer learners a chance to reflect on their experiences, bring their own
perspective to a problem, and analyze the issues without the pressure
and immediacy of a class discussion. Such an exercise can result in a
disorienting moment. For example, in a criminal procedure class in
which the topic was search and seizure and criminal profiles, a student
wrote:
This area of the law just gets under my skin and I can't really put my
finger on it but it's not just the issue of what's a search or seizure
but also "profiles" and the definition of reasonable expectation and
the court's acceptance of a person's ability to completely waive his/
her fourth amendment right without even knowing that he/she has
done so.... If the police can give a valid reason for their actions
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(basing decisionmaking on race is expedient and catches criminals)
it's O.K. I thought it was interesting that people can agree that race
can be a consideration in trying to get criminals but it can't be a
factor in hiring, housing, raises....
This kind of comment may occur in small classes, but it is obvious
from the way the journal entry is written that it took time to develop
and was prompted by a sense of discomfort. It appears as if the
learner is experiencing a disorienting moment facilitated by the jour-
nal. What is missed through the journal experience is the opportunity
for a teacher to push the student into examining what this means
about privilege in our society and reflecting on who benefits. Some of
this can be done through the teacher's comments upon reading the
journal. No matter how successful that effort may be, however, the
teacher loses the opportunity to examine this reflection with the class
as a whole.
Traditional classes need not be sterile. We can create opportuni-
ties for our students to have a first-hand experience. Techniques for
creating this experience include combining the class with a clinical
component, tours of legal institutions outside of the law school, and
assignments that require students to observe or experience how peo-
ple are treated by the legal system. One teacher suggests that we
should specifically focus the students on privilege and the effects of
privilege. 178 She asks her students to notice, for example, who is asked
to empty his or her pockets when going through the metal detector in
court; inevitably, the students see the racial pattern in those requests.
Another teacher requires his students to live on a welfare budget. 179
He has them keep a record of what their budget is for two weeks, and
then asks them what their life would be like if they had to live on that
budget for the rest of their lives. What would they eliminate from
their own budget in order to live? How are the things that they elimi-
nate nonessential? He posits a situation in which their child's birthday
is coming up and they want to buy a birthday present. Is that an es-
sential item? This exercise often changes the way the students view
the poor. Once the student can see contextual nuance, the opinions
and perspectives of others become more valuable. This sets a tone in
the classroom that allows for discussions of perspective, power, and
justice.
The traditional socratic teaching method using appellate deci-
178 Comments of Professor Susan Bryant of CUNY Queens Law School, roundtable
discussion at the Clinical Theory Workshop at New York Law School, Feb. 23, 1996.
179 Conversation with Daniel Greenberg, formerly of Harvard Law School, presently
Director of the New York City Legal Aid Society, at roundtable discussion, Clinical Theory
Workshop, New York Law School, Feb. 23, 1996.
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sions may also be a source for "disorienting moments." For example,
People v. Hall180 is a rich case for opening windows of critical con-
sciousness. The case, which was decided in 1854, concerns an appeal
by a white defendant challenging his conviction for murder. The pri-
mary evidence against the defendant was provided by a Chinese wit-
ness. On appeal, the defendant argued that the Chinese witness
should have been barred from testifying because an 1850 statute pro-
vided that "no Black, or Mulatto person, or Indian shall be allowed to
give evidence in favor of, or against a White man. ' 181 The court's
task was to determine whether a Chinese person was included in the
statute and therefore should have been prohibited from testifying.
The court arrived at several ways in which the Chinese were implicitly
included in the testimonial prohibition. It reasoned that Indians origi-
nally migrated from Asia, so the Chinese fit within the Indian cate-
gory. It determined that "Black" was a generic term encompassing all
non-whites and clearly the Chinese were not white. Thus the convic-
tion was overturned. The case starkly demonstrates the imposition of
racism through evidentiary rules.
It is not difficult for the students to criticize this precedent. Inevi-
tably students recognize that past cases embody racist and sexist as-
sumptions which color the analysis, yet many steadfastly contend that
those days are gone. They argue that such contaminated logic is not
found in modern cases. Often class discussion becomes so focused on
how far we have come in our analysis of race in the law that there is
very little chance of opening any windows of critical consciousness
through the criticism of this precedent. Such class discussion may be
deceptive, however. A journal entry about People v. Hall demon-
strates that at least one of the students in the class was beginning to
get disoriented. This student, a white male, wrote:
I am struck here by the assumption that, to divine the correct
answer, we need only define our terms and apply the statute. I am
struck because, although the result was so outrageous to our eyes
today, we apply the same reasoning, with the same acquiescence to
authority, to the cases we read everyday! Perhaps we should be
asking - Wait - who wrote the statute? Or more importantly,
what point of view was absolutely absent from the statute?
Certainly the kind of analysis offered in this journal entry can be
raised in class. Although the learner did not complete the examina-
tion of privilege by analyzing how he has benefitted from that reason-
ing, this additional step can be taken in class.
In the journal entry, the student used one approach to bring Hall




into the present. Another way to accomplish this result is to focus on
the court's assertion that Chinese are non-whites. I ask my students:
"Are Chinese people white people?" They answer easily, "No." I re-
spond: "How do you know that they are not white?" This often baf-
fles them as they struggle to tell me why. The answer, of course, has
much to do with the precedential value of Hall in defining what is
white. That precedent clearly affects the students' present-day as-
sumptions about the distinction among races. 182 Once the students
begin to see how race is an entirely constructed notion and not some-
thing they can "prove," I ask them to analyze who benefits in our
culture from the seeming ability to identify people as white or non-
white.
To reach the majority of the students, I must demonstrate that
racist logic infects cases today.183 I have had some success in disori-
enting the students by using the case of City of Memphis v. Greene.184
The City of Memphis erected a barrier to stop traffic through an all-
white neighborhood based on the white residents' asserted interest in
traffic safety. The barrier was strategically placed at the line between
the white neighborhood and the predominately black neighborhood.
The United States Supreme Court found no invidious racial discrimi-
nation and no violation of law. I begin the analysis of the case by
offering the students some context in which to place this opinion. I
have found that when studying race cases that are based in residential
segregation, I have to overcome the belief that such segregation is the
result of a natural phenomenon rather than a social construction.
Therefore, it is essential to provide enough historical information to
evaluate that privileged belief.
182 For a comprehensive analysis of the legal construction of race and the impact of
these precedents, see LOPEZ, supra note 9.
183 Ian Haney Lopez analyzes the prerequisite cases that construct our conception of
race. He then turns to how these cases are reinforced in modern cases. His discussion of
the legal construction of race raises many questions about the law's neutrality and the
operation of privilege. These questions are useful for stimulating discussion among stu-
dents when analyzing the race cases. He notes:
That law constructs race is evident. How it does so, however, remains a more
difficult question. In assessing this, inquiries along two roughly parallel axes can be
pursued. First, how do legal rules fashion races? Does law operate simply to control
behavior through a series of penalties and rewards, and if so, how can these devices
define races? Or does the law operate as an ideological system, as a source of beliefs
about what society does and must look like? If the latter, how does this system
influence or create ideas about race? Second, what role do legal actors play? More
particularly are judges, lawyers and legal consumers conscious creators of racial be-
liefs? Or are these actors largely unaware of the legal construction of race, unwitting
participants in such processes and passive victims of law's constitutive powers?
Id. at 113.
184 451 U.S. 100 (1980).
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City of Memphis concerns the neighborhood of Hein Park. This
part of the city was developed well before World War II as an exclu-
sive residential neighborhood for white citizens and these characteris-
tics have been maintained. 185 In 1963 the Supreme Court
unanimously invalidated the segregation of Memphis' public parks.
The Court found "an unmistakable and pervasive pattern of local seg-
regation, which, in fact, the city makes no attempt to deny. ' 186 The
white Hein Park residents' original proposal for the barrier at issue in
Greene sought closure of all four streets connecting the neighborhood
to the nearby black community. The City of Memphis had never
before closed a street for traffic control purposes. The white residents
asserted that "undesirable traffic"' 87 had the effect of staining their
neighborhood's "good" qualities. Uncontested testimony by the
plaintiff's expert established that the barrier was likely to have a sig-
nificant negative psychological effect on the black residents in the ad-
joining neighborhood. 188
The Supreme Court majority did not address the plain and pow-
erful symbolic message of the inconvenience. 189 Although Brown v.
Board of Education1 90 recognized that "separat[ion] of a group of
people solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as
to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds
in a way unlikely ever to be undone,"' 9' and although the African
American residents in Greene had testified that they were stigmatized,
humiliated and relegated to a lower status in Memphis, 192 the Court
totally ignored the demoralizing message conveyed by the barrier. 193
The process by which the city decided to close the street reflected
administrative exclusion of the black residents of Hein Park. Despite
an unambiguous requirement that applications for street closings be
signed by all owners of property abutting on the thoroughfare to be
closed, the city permitted this application to go through without the
signature or the consent of a person who owned property abutting the
185 Id. at 139-43.
186 Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 534 (1963).
187 Justice Marshall stated that such words were little more than code words for racial
discrimination. Greene, 451 U.S. at 136.
188 See id. at 139.
189 Id. at 138.
190 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
191 Id. at 494.
192 Greene testified: "[B]ecause we are black, we cannot drive through a piece of prop-
erty that is collectively owned by us. This would cause psychological damage to me person-
ally." Greene, 451 U.S. at 140 n.3. He also said that he perceived the barrier as "simply an
extension of the insult and humiliation that we have tolerated and experienced too long
already." Id.
193 See id. at 146-48.
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proposed barrier.194 Furthermore, the black property owners living
north of Hein Park were not given notice that the Planning Commis-
sion was considering an application to close West Drive.195 When Re-
spondents discovered that the issue was being considered, the City
gave them only 15 minutes to speak. Thus, the black residents on the
north end of Hein Park were effectively excluded from participation
in the political and administrative process that culminated in the deci-
sion to erect the barrier.
Once the students are aware of the foregoing details, we examine
the opinion's reasoning. Many students note the Court's studied de-
termination to ignore the racial implications and they identify the rhe-
torical techniques used by the justices to support their findings.
Occasionally, there is a racial split within the class as to whether the
decision to erect the barrier was based on the desire of the white com-
munity to shut out black travelers. This creates an opportunity to ex-
plore the neutrality issue more specifically. We can look at the
differences in the learners' perspective based on background and ex-
perience and how that affects their tendency to credit or ignore certain
evidence. No matter whether the students believe the opinion was
correctly decided or not, the case is extremely useful in demonstrating
that the administration of justice is not neutral. From that recognition
of non-neutrality, I can ask the students to reflect upon how their own
experience may affect their reading of the case and the weighing of
the evidence. I ask them to answer the ultimate question: Who bene-
fits from the Supreme Court's interpretation of the evidence?
Affirmative action is a subject that is likely to stimulate "confirm-
ing moments" in the traditional classroom. It touches deeply-held
ideas about merit and guilt that are very difficult to discuss in a man-
ner that moves the class forward. The key, of course, to understand-
ing the need for affirmative action is through a recognition of the ways
in which privilege operates as a perpetual affirmative action program
for those who have it. Challenging precedent risks reinforcing stereo-
types as the students fight to support a decision already reinforced by
a court's reasoning. We must be careful how we proceed. Hopwood
v. State of Texas196 offers a stark opportunity to have the students ex-
amine the ways in which privilege affects the law. Cheryl Hopwood
and several other white applicants to the University of Texas School of
Law (UT) challenged the school's admissions process on equal protec-
tion grounds. They alleged and proved that minority race was used as
a plus factor in evaluating files. The Law School defended the case by
194 Id. at 144.
195 Id. at 143.
196 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2580 (1996).
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asserting that the state had a compelling interest in remedying past
discrimination in primary and secondary schools and also had a com-
pelling interest in promoting diversity in the student body. Applying
the "strict scrutiny" standard, the Court found these interests insuffi-
cient to support a race-conscious admissions program and ruled that
such a policy had indeed violated the plaintiffs' equal protection
rights. The following is a portion of the opinion evaluating the Law
School's asserted interest in diversity:
Within the general principles of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the use of race in admissions for diversity in higher education con-
tradicts, rather than furthers, the aims of equal protection. Diver-
sity fosters, rather than minimizes the use of race. It treats
minorities as a group, rather than as individuals. It may further re-
medial purposes but, just as likely, may promote improper racial
stereotypes, thus fueling racial hostility.
The use of race, in and of itself, to choose students simply
achieves a student body that looks different. Such a criterion is no
more rational on its own terms than would be choices based upon
the physical size or blood type of applicants. Thus, the Supreme
Court has long held that governmental actors cannot justify their
decisions solely because of race.
A university may properly favor one applicant over another be-
cause of his ability to play cello,' make a downfield tackle, or under-
stand chaos theory. An admissions process may also consider an
applicant's home state or relationship to school alumni. Law
schools specifically may look at things such as unusual or substantial
extracurricular activities in college, which may be atypical factors
affecting undergraduate grades. Schools may even consider factors
such as whether an applicant's parents attended college or the appli-
cant's economic and social background. 197
I ask my students to evaluate several questions after reading this
opinion: What are the assumptions about race and diversity inherent
in the decision? Are they true? What are the implications of these
assumptions? How is race different from the factors that can be con-
sidered for purposes of admission? These questions prompt the stu-
dents to make the privilege inherent in this decision visible. They
force the students to analyze privilege before we discuss the underly-
ing question of the legitimacy of affirmative action. In this manner, I
attempt to avoid allowing the Court to foster the creation of a "con-
firming moment."
These are examples of techniques that can be used on occasion in
traditional law school classes. Increasingly, law schools are offering
197 Id. at 945-46 (citations omitted).
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perspective courses that allow the teacher to make the examination of
privilege an explicit part of the agenda. Over the past three years, I
have been teaching a course called "Gender, Race, Sexuality and the
Law. ' 198 The course has drawn approximately fifty or more students
each time it is offered. The course description is as follows:
Privilege and power affect assumptions made in the law about dif-
ferences among people. This perspective course will examine as-
sumptions made in the law about gender, race, class, sexuality, and
disability, and the impact of those assumptions on the application of
law. The course looks at the meaning of power and privilege, the
construction of exclusion within the law, and the concept of differ-
ence. What does difference mean, i.e. different from whom? What
legal significance should be given and who decides the legal signifi-
cance of the perceived "difference"? What role does dominance
and hegemony play in our concept of difference? The course will
close with alternative visions of justice. The goal of this course is to
learn to read the law critically, and with a sensitivity to the ways in
which legal techniques reproduce patterns of power and privilege
that subordinate groups on the basis of categories of identity.
As is evident from this description, the course has an explicit agenda
to raise questions about the distribution of power and privilege in our
present legal system. 199
The course attracts an interesting mix of students. Many of the
students are longing for a critical outlet for their frustrations with the
law. Most of these students are "outsiders." In spite of the fact that
African Americans comprise only 7-8 percent of the total student
body, they comprise roughly 20 percent of the students in this class.
Women make up roughly 50-60 percent of the population of the class,
but only 41 percent of the population of the law school. Openly gay
and lesbian students make up roughly 5-10 percent of the class but
only about two percent of the law school population.2°° Recently, I
have attracted more heterosexual, white men (about 35 percent of the
class). This group tends to be divided between men who identify
themselves as having progressive politics and a group of Federalist So-
198 See also, e.g., Balos, supra note 166; Mary I. Coombs, Non-sexist Teaching Tech-
niques in Substantive Law Courses, 14 S. ILL. U. L.J. 507 (1990); Mary Jo Eyster, Integrat-
ing Non-Sexist/Racist Perspectives into Traditional Course and Clinical Settings, 14 S. ILL.
U. L.J. 471 (1990); Stephanie Wildman, The Question of Silence: Techniques to Ensure Full
Class Participation, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 147 (1988).
199 The course promises far more than it can deliver. However, one of its strengths is
the excellent book that the students use, LESLIE BENDER & DAAN BRAVEMAN, POWER,
PRIVILEGE AND LAW: A CIVIL RIGHTS READER (1995).
200 It is difficult to assess the number of gay students in the law school overall. I have
found that some of the gay students come out in the class but are not generally "out" in the
law school population.
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ciety members who look forward to challenging the other students
and me. These demographics make for a group with plenty of diver-
sity in both experience and opinion.
The subjects we cover are race, gender, sexuality, class, disability,
and the intersection of these characteristics. The materials are system-
atically structured to move the students through a certain process of
understanding. For each segment, I ask the students to identify their
personal beliefs and cultural stereotypes about the group we are
studying. Next, we analyze how societal structures reinforce the posi-
tions of power and privilege that shape our personal views and cul-
tural stereotypes. In doing so, we look at a variety of law review
articles, books, and cross-disciplinary texts.201 Finally, we analyze how
legal decisions reinforce societal structures, and we identify the false
assumptions that may be present in the court decisions we read. The
course counters the notion that the law is neutral; the students are
fully aware of the need to identify how privilege affects their analysis.
The students' background and experience play a significant role in
classroom discussions. These conditions often prompt "disorienting
moments." As a part of the course, the students keep journals to af-
ford opportunities for reflection outside the classroom. 20 2
Once the students begin to question the law's neutrality, many
express concern that they may unwittingly view evidence and claims
by their clients in ways that reinforce existing power structures. They
are eager for ways to combat the effect of limited perspectives. I build
into the classroom opportunities for the students to try to identify how
their experience affects their perspective:
Once again, the O.J. Simpson case is irresistible for this pur-
pose.20 3 I divided the students into small diverse groups. I asked stu-
201 Frances Ansley suggests that we introduce our students to readings about legal edu-
cation. As she states, "I certainly didn't know about it when I was in law school. At that
time, I thought all professors simply taught the material without much soul-searching, and
certainly without arguing among themselves about it." Frances L. Ansley, Bringing Values
and Perspectives Back into the Law School Classroom: Practical Ideas for Teachers, 4 S.
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 7, 17 (1994). Because of the occasional disdain that these
courses provoke, related readings on legal education give additional support to the idea
that these issues are important outside the classroom setting, that these issues are not com-
pletely "personal" and merit serious scholarly debate.
202 Personal, experience-based papers by students carry several advantages. As Ansley
notes, "First, they validate and honor student experience in a way that I believe is all too
rare in law school. They can also be a real aid in the pedagogical project I have just identi-
fied: helping us anchor our teaching approaches in our students' own varied experiences
while making it more possible for them to similarly anchor their own approaches to learn-
ing." Id. at 19. As previously noted, the main disadvantage of reflection papers is that
students may try to "second-guess" what they believe the teacher wants to hear. Equally
troubling are those students who refuse to acknowledge any change in their assumptions.
203 Stephanie Wildman and Margalynne Armstrong also use the O.J. Simpson case as an
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dents to describe how they felt about the case when they first heard
about it, in the middle of the trial, and after the announcement of the
verdict. Once they identified their personal positions, I asked them to
examine what aspects of their own background may have affected
their views of the case and may have caused them to see the case
differently from others in the group who came from different back-
grounds. I explained that they should not argue about who was right
or wrong, but rather identify how different experiences might influ-
ence one's opinion of the evidence, its relevance, and its significance.
Not unpredictably, the black students - both male and female -
tended to credit the race issue more than the white students did.
White women often focused primarily on the issue of spousal abuse,
and white men often mentioned class as a phenomenon affecting the
outcome of the case. We then came back to the group. I asked for
some volunteers to talk about what they had learned in the small dis-
cussion groups. I asked questions to encourage the students to iden-
tify how their perspectives might be limited by their experiences and
might prevent them from acknowledging phenomena that affected the
case. We then focused on the patterns that emerged and we talked
about what legal strategies we might be able to glean from the
exercise.
This class exercise is only the beginning. What is missing from
this class is an evaluation of the differences. The question remains:
"What do we do with the difference in perspective?" If white people
and people of color experience police practices differently, for exam-
ple, whose perspective should control? In order for this exercise to be
useful in teaching about justice, the students should be able to ex-
amine that question in light of what they are learning about privilege.
The media response to the O.J. Simpson verdict endorsed a particular
view that privileged the white reaction.20 4 As long as we fail to iden-
tify the effect of white privilege, we will maintain its corrupting power
and domination and be unable to address racial oppression.
If one's goal is to teach law students how their own perspectives
affect the world, classes that have a clear agenda of examining privi-
lege are often very satisfying (although extremely unnerving). Fur-
thermore, such classes generally attract students who are open to such
an approach. However, the important messages about judgment, priv-
ilege, and perspective should not be relegated to a single course. We
have seen the problems with such treatment in the professional re-
example of how white skin privilege affected the general public's reactions to the case and
to the jury's verdict. WILDMAN, supra note 40, at 177.
204 Id.
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sponsibility area.20 5 It is essential that we integrate analysis of differ-
ence into traditional courses to ensure that students begin the life-long
process of examining their exercise of privilege and develop an appre-
ciation of the professional value of striving for justice, fairness, and
morality. What I am suggesting is a fundamental restructuring and
rethinking of the way we approach legal education at its base.
CONCLUSION
The MacCrate Report has reinvigorated legal education by iden-
tifying fundamental skills and values that are essential to effective law-
yering. As we go through the process of ensuring that we train
students in these fundamentals, we should not ignore the values iden-
tified in the report. At the heart of these values is the injunction that
lawyers should strive to promote justice, fairness, and morality. Law
schools and law teachers can play a significant role in instilling in our
students a passion to ensure justice.
This endeavor is deeply satisfying. I live for the moments in
teaching when my students gain new insights into social justice and,
perhaps more precisely, social injustice. Passive understanding, with-
out a deeper internalization, is insufficient. The goal is to have the
student capture the experience and hold its lesson for a lifetime. I be-
lieve that we can best teach students to be compassionate and to do
justice if we stop focusing on the "other" and turn their focus on
themselves.
Injustice is disorienting. I have argued that when disorienting
moments occur, we should seize upon them and help our students de-
velop a critical consciousness of the operation of power and privilege
both in the situation that they are observing and in themselves. I have
described ways that we can construct learning experiences that will
maximize the possibilities of "disorienting moments." Even if those
moments remain rare, legal educators concerned about social justice
and racism can embrace those moments as windows of opportunity.
We can use them to educate our students not only about how power
and privilege caused the unfairness or reinforced the stereotype to
which they are reacting, but also examine how the students' own
power and privilege allowed them to be oblivious to the effects and
inadvertently contribute to suffering. Once privilege is unmasked, the
student can no longer be unaware. First, the students must recognize
that the law is not neutral. Second, the individual must extend the
protection and perquisites of that privilege to people who are op-
205 See generally TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 4.
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pressed and subordinated. 20 6 In this manner, we can help our students
develop the skill of compassion and encourage them to join in the
collective effort to do justice. 20 7
206 These are just initial suggestions, and I urge those interested in this area to add to the
list of what can be done once a student realizes the structure of oppression. We have to
offer ideas so that students who are ready to accept this role in pursuing justice do not
abandon the struggle out of frustration or a sense of helplessness.
207 This is essentially a jurisprudence of justice that goes beyond critique to conceptual-
izing a vision about the future. As Linda Greene notes:
It would be a jurisprudence of hope, a vision about the circumstances under which
the boundaries about existing law and our aspirations about a just society might be
eliminated. We could incorporate in this idea of justice the knowledge of both male
and female visions of justice, not essentialized but evaluated for the richness they
might give for an inclusive vision of justice. We need to understand how justice is
perceived, manipulated, made to appear apparent or irrelevant, and how the blatant
absence of justice reinforces a coercive ideal which may be tolerable only because
the weak and the powerless suffer its effects.
Linda Greene, The Justice Mission of the Law Schools, 40 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 353, 355
(1992).
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